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use#LAAThe FDA’s Role in the Development of Bioterrorist Countermeasures
By Marcelo Guerra
Abstract: As the agency that approves drug products used to treat bioterrorist diseases, the FDA plays a
signiﬁcant role in the domestic preparation against a bioterrorist attack. The changes that occurred at the
agency in response the AIDS and cancer crises of the 1980’s have served as a blueprint for the changes
made in response to the terrorist threat. These changes, often desirable but sometimes not, push even
further the agency’s role as a collaborator in drug development. The paper investigates the threat of a
biological weapon attack and the changes to the drug approval process that this threat has prompted.
1The FDA’s Role in the Development of Bioterrorist Countermeasures
The September 11th attacks and the subsequent anthrax scare have made public oﬃcials and the American
population more fearful of a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction. While only 1% of Americans
cited terrorism as the nation’s number 1 problem just prior to the attacks, that number spiked to 46% in
October of 2001.1 More recent Gallup Poll survey shows that 82% of Americans see international terrorism
as a critical threat, while 75% make the same judgment about the spread of weapons of mass destruction.2
Currently, 85% of Americans view terrorism as an important issue on election day, a close second to the
state of the economy (86%).3
The increased fear of a terrorist attack has translated into greater government investment in anti-terrorism
policies. After the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive
(PDD) 39, a federal plan to respond to similar emergencies or disasters.4 Later annexes and directives dealt
speciﬁcally with federal response to terrorist attacks.5 In a 1999 speech to the National Academy of Sciences,
President Clinton summarized his administration’s eﬀorts to combat the terrorist threat, noting a $10 billion
appropriation to combat terrorism, including $1.4 billion to protect against biological terror.6 This reﬂected
1Jeﬀrey M. Jones, Sept. 11 Eﬀects, Though Largely Faded, Persist, The Gallup Organization, September, 9 2003. The
attacks also had signiﬁcant immediate eﬀects on public expression of patriotism and trust in government. Though these eﬀects
dissipated one year after the attacks, less intense but longer term eﬀects remain.
2David W. Moore, Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction Most Critical Threats, The Gallup Organization, March 8,
2004.
3Frank Newport, The Potential Impact of Iraq on the Election, The Gallup Organization, March 19, 2004. Other
surveys have studied the correlation between perceived level of risk and anti-terrorism policy. Surveys conducted two years
after the attack show that a signiﬁcant number of respondents (50%) demonstrate hind-sight bias: reporting that their risk
assessments did not rise after September 11th. Respondents who exhibit hind-sight bias are much less supportive of anti-
terrorism policies such as passenger screening and surveillance. Nevertheless, all respondents generally support passenger
proﬁling and surveillance policies, particularly those who updated their risk assessments after the attacks. See W. Kip Vis-
cusi & Richard Zeckhauser, Hind-Sight Choice Bias in Combating Terrorism, Discussion Paper No. 458 (2004), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin center/.
4See Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/oﬀdocs/pdd39.htm.
5A 1997 Annex by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) updated PDD-39 to deal speciﬁcally with terrorist
threats. In 1998, another decision directive, PDD-62, described various federal agency roles in preparing for and responding to
weapons of mass destruction. See PDD-62, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/oﬀdocs/pdd62.htm.
6William Clinton, “On Keeping America Secure for the 21st Century,” remarks before the National Academy of Sciences,
Washington, D.C. (January 22, 1999), at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/nas.htm.
2a 4.3 billion dollar increase in spending since 1997.7 By the end of his administration, national preparedness
was seen as a top administration priority.8
Congress also sought to increase national preparedness for a terrorist attack by passing bills such as the
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. The Act provided local law enforcement and ﬁrst re-
sponder units with federal training on how to detect, neutralize, and contain weapons of mass destruction.
9 It also required the Department of Defense to designate an oﬃcial in charge of coordinating federal as-
sistance to local oﬃcials, created a rapid response team at the Department of Defense capable of detecting
and neutralizing weapons of mass destruction, and provided for training exercises beginning in 1997.10
Although spending levels on anti-terrorism policies had risen even prior to September 11th,11 that event accel-
erated the implementation of national security programs and increased spending on domestic preparedness.
Following the attacks the Bush administration implemented ﬁve new strategies and updated two additional
strategies dealing with national security issues.12 It also established the Department of Homeland Security
to coordinate and implement domestic security policies. The 2004 Federal Budget includes $41 billion in
homeland security spending, doubling the funding in 2002.13
One area of particular concern is the domestic preparation for a bioterrorist attack. Despite increased spend-
ing and programs aimed generally at the terrorist threat, early eﬀorts to prepare for biochemical attacks
were limited and often ad hoc.14 The eﬀorts were often retarded by questions regarding the signiﬁcance of
7General Accounting Office (GAO), GAO/T-NSIAD/GDD-99-107, Combating Terrorism: Observations on Fed-
eral Spending to Combat Terrorism 3 (March 11, 1999).
8See, e.g., Laurie Garrett, Plan to Fight New Terrorism, NEWSDAY, Jan. 23, 1999, at A4; James Benet, Clinton Tells of
Antiterrorism Plans, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1998, at A12.
9Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-201, §§ 1412(a)(1) & (e)(1), 110 Stat. 2422
(1996).
10See id. §§1413-15.
11See GAO, GAO-02-141T, Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness (October 9, 2001) (hereinafter
GAO-02-141T).
12See GAO, GAO-04-408T, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies
Related to Terrorism, 3 (February 3, 2004) (hereinafter GAO-04-408T).
13Oﬃce of Management and Budget (OMB), Winning the War on Terrorism, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/budget.html.
14See Gov. James S. Gilmore, chairman, Second Annual Report to the President and Congress of
the Advisory Panel to Asses Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
3biochemical threat.15 Some members of Congress also questioned whether proposed security measures would
inhibit scientiﬁc research.16 As a result, analyses of national preparedness repeatedly emphasized the need
to increase eﬀorts in all areas.17
Emphasizing the need for preparation against this threat, recent legislative and executive eﬀorts have focused
on the need to develop countermeasures against potential bioterrorist diseases. Bioterrorist countermeasures,
referred to in some legislation as “priority countermeasures,” are drugs, biological products, devices, vaccines,
antivirals, or diagnostic tests that may be used to treat, identify, or prevent infection by a biologic agent
or toxin that may cause a public health emergency. While many countermeasures for bioterrorist diseases
already exist, others will required signiﬁcant time, eﬀort, and money to research, develop, and produce.
To ﬁll this void, 12 bills were introduced in Congress dealing with the development of countermeasures
against a bioterrorism attack,18 one of which was enacted. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (PHSBPRA) has tightened controls on biological agents and toxins
and has required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to conduct and award grants to develop coun-
termeasures. In his January 2004 State of the Union address, President Bush proposed further legislation to
encourage the development of countermeasures against biological and chemical weapons.19 Dubbed Project
Bioshield, the bill will provide the federal government with additional resources and authority to invest in
Destruction: II. Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (December 15, 2000) available at
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror2.pdf.
15See e.g., Daniel S. Greenberg, The Bioterrorism Panic, J. COM., Mar. 23, 1999, at 5A; Anthony Shadid, Funding on
Rise for Research into Bioterrorism, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 29, 2001, at A1 (noting that critics have questioned such a
substantial investment in a public health threat that... remains, by most accounts, highly unlikely....); Neil C. Livingstone,
Clinton Anti-Terror Plan is Correct, NEWSDAY, Feb. 3, 1999, at A37 (noting that the Administration’s proposals have been
criticized as unnecessary and too costly, designed to frighten the public and usurp traditional civilian authority.).
16See Aaron Zitner, Clinton’s 1999 Proposal That Labs Be Required to List All Their Dangerous Agents Failed to Win
Congress’ OK, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, at A13.
17See id.; L. Paul Bremer III, chairman, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism: Report
of the National Commission on Terrorism, (June 5, 2000), available at http://w3.access.gpo.gov/nct/.
18Oﬃce of Legislative Policy and Analysis, Legislative Updates, (April 18, 2004), at
http://olpa.od.nih.gov/legislation/107/pendinglegislation/6bioterroism.asp.
19Oﬃce of the Press Secretary, President Details Project Bioshield, (February 3, 2003), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030203.html.
4and purchase biochemical countermeasures. Current estimates expect $6 billion in spending over the next
ten years.
As the agency that ensures the safety and eﬃcacy of these new products, the FDA plays an important role
in the development of bioterrorist countermeasures. The approval process for a new drug involves a tradeoﬀ
between ensuring the safety and eﬃcacy of marketed drugs and promoting the availability of new drugs. In
the early part of last century, the FDA emphasized the former at the expense of the latter. The emergence
of the AIDS crises in the 1980s prompted several changes in FDA policy. The Agency became more willing
to accept greater risks in exchange for earlier access and approval of drugs and, more fundamentally, re-
envisioned itself as collaborator in the development of new drugs. The emerging bioterrorist threat has
pushed this role further: the greater level of risk associated with earlier drug approval is no longer a response
to the current need of patients suﬀering with diseases but to the risk of an outbreak of a bioterrorist disease.
This paper will discuss the bioterrorist threat and associated changes at the FDA, analyzing the desirability
of change in speciﬁc situations, and noting how these changes aﬀect the FDA’s role in the drug development
process.
A. The Risk of a Biochemical Attack
Separating rhetoric from fact is a crucial ﬁrst step in determining the changes needed to deal with the threat
of a biological attack. The dimensions of the risk involve several factors, including the type of biological
agents available, the numbers and type of organizations involved, the motivations to use those agents in
an attack, the likelihood of success, and the potential eﬀects of those agents. While some politicians and
lawmakers have used hyper-inﬂated rhetoric in support of anti-terrorism legislation, many experts believe
5that large-scale biochemical attacks are improbable in the near future.20 These experts claim that, “in recent
years, United States policy to combat the threat of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction has been
driven by perceptions of vulnerability to such attacks rather than the likelihood.”
Although some policymakers emphasize the potentially devastating consequences of an attack, current tech-
nical and motivational barriers makes such attacks unlikely in the near future. Conventional weapons and
possible small-scale biochemical attacks will remain the most likely short-term risk. However, as technology
evolves and terrorist motivations change, large scale biological attacks with potentially dire consequences
will become increasingly likely in the future.21 Because new drugs often taken several years to develop and
approve, this increasing threat requires current attention.
1. High Risk Agents
Domestic vulnerability to a biological attack depends in part on the agents available for an attack and the
current treatments for the diseases caused by those agents. Both government and non-government experts
have compiled lists of biological agents that may be used in a terrorist attack. Rather than determine which
agents are likely to be used (a very uncertain task), the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has categorized
agents primarily based on the agent’s ability to inﬂict devastating consequences. Other factors include the
agent’s environmental resistance, ability to spread from person to person, the size of the eﬀective dose, and
the availability of treatment. The list of category A agents – agents that pose a serious threat to national
20“A domestic bioterrorist attack is considered to be a low-probability event, in part because of the various diﬃculties involved
in successfully delivering biological agents to achieve large-scale casualties.” GAO-02-141T, supra note 11, at 3. Other reports
note that experts have disagreed on the likelihood of biochemical attacks but seem to conclude that the probability is low.
GAO, GAO-01-915, Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities 1 & 5 (September 2001).
21See Margaret Hamburg, Bioterrorism: A Challenge to Public Health and Medicine, in Public Health Issues in Disaster
Preparedness 93 (Aspen Publications 2001) (“Conventional attacks such as bombs remain the most likely mode of terrorism,
but there are many reasons to believe that biological agents may be an increasingly attractive approach.”); Jennifer Brower
& Peter Chalk, The Global Threat of New and Reemerging Infectious Diseases 73 n.34 (RAND 2003) (“a large-scale
use of [bioweapons] by terrorists is unlikely in the near future because of lack of both motive and technical capabilities.”);
Jessica Stern, Taking the Terror Out of Bioterrorism, New York Times, April 8, 1998.
6health and security – currently includes anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, tularemia, and viral hemor-
rhagic fever.22 Fortunately, the number of agents robust enough to be deployed over a large area is small
and in many cases, treatment is currently available.23
Anthrax is a disease caused by a spore forming bacterium called bacillus anthracis, which is found naturally
in the soil where it can live for several years. The disease may be contracted through skin (cutaneous) con-
tact, ingestion, and inhalation. The majority of anthrax cases in humans have occurred through cutaneous
contact with infected animals. This form of the disease occurs commonly in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa,
but is very rare in the United States. Antibiotic therapies are very eﬀective in curing cutaneous anthrax,
making the disease rarely fatal. Gastrointestinal anthrax following the consumption of infected animals is
also possible but very rare. Inhalation anthrax is the most serious form of the disease but also the most
uncommon in nature. In the past inhalation anthrax was an occupational hazard of wool and textile workers
but was eliminated through immunization.24
Inhaled anthrax is considered by some to be the agent most likely to be used in a bioterrorist attack. Be-
cause the spore form of this bacterium can survive long periods without nutrients or moisture, the organism
lends itself towards aerosolization. When aerosolized, the organism behaves like a gas and is resistant to
environmental degradation. Thus, in the right conditions, the agent could be spread over a large area and
cause high rates of fatality.25 Releasing 50kg of the bacterium upwind of a 500,000 person population center
could cause 95,000 deaths and 125,000 hospitalizations.26 On the other hand, anthrax is rarely contagious
from person to person, nor do anthrax spores from clothes or skin re-enter the air. Hence the number of
22Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Emergency Preparedness & Response: Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases
Category A, at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp (hereinafter CDC Category A Diseases).
23Theodore J. Cieslak and Edward M. Eitzen, Jr., Bioterrorism: Agents of Concern, in Public Health Issues in Disaster
Preparedness 78 (2001).
24See id. at 79; CDC Category A Diseases, supra note 22.
25Cieslak & Eitzen, supra note 23, at 80.
26CDC, Use of Anthrax Vaccine in the United States: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices, 49(1) MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 2 (December 2000) (quoting a World Health Organization
estimate).
7cases will be limited to those who directly inhale the spores.
When inhaled, anthrax typically has a one to six day incubation period. After incubation, a victim often
suﬀers a ﬂu-like illness, sometimes followed by a period of improvement. Death results in 95 percent of
inhalation anthrax cases when not treated within 48 hours after symptoms begin. Currently there are three
types of countermeasures against anthrax: vaccinations, antibiotics, and anti-toxin treatments. Although
no controlled trials in humans have been performed to validate treatment procedures, limited clinical expe-
rience, animal, and in vitro tests suggest that cyproﬂaxin and doxycycline can be used to treat the disease.
27 In addition, some experts recommend both post-exposure vaccination and antibiotic therapy.28
Botulism is a neuroparalytic illness caused by a powerful neurotoxin produced by Clostridium botulinum, an
anaerobic spore forming bacteria. The disease is transmitted in one of three ways. Infant botulism occurs in
a small number of infants who carry C. botulinum in their intestinal tracts. Wound botulism occurs when a
wound is infected with the bacterium. Food botulism occurs when a person ingests pre-formed toxin, most
frequently from home-canned food prepared unsafely.29 Like anthrax, botulism does not spread from person
to person nor can it be spread through the air.
A latency period of between one to several days follows exposure. Symptoms usually involve nerve paralysis
always beginning with the cranial nerves. If untreated the illness may cause paralysis in the respiratory
system, resulting in death. There are 169 yearly US cases, about 5% of which die.30 Although a solitary case
may be diﬃcult to diagnose properly, a cluster of symptoms among several patients should make detection
easy.
The extensive and prolonged treatment in cases of botulism makes it an attractive agent for a bioterrorist
27CDC, Update: Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax and Interim Guidelines for Exposure Management
and Antimicrobial Therapy, 50(42) MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 2 (October 2001), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5042a1.htm#tab1.
28Cieslak & Eitzen, supra note 23, at 81.
29See CDC, Disease Information: Botulism, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/botulism t.htm; Cieslak &
Eitzen, supra note 23, at 83.
30See CDC, supra note 29.
8attack. Patients must receive supportive care and often remain on ventilators for months. A wide scale bo-
tulism outbreak would likely strain current medical resources, but the CDC currently has botulism antitoxin
that may prevent progression of the disease.31
Plague is a now uncommon disease caused by Yersinia pestis. Bubonic plague, which is transmitted from
the bite of infected rat ﬂea, is the most common naturally occurring form of the disease, with between 1000
and 3000 yearly cases. Because the organism is highly infective, the disease often spreads to other parts of
the body. When it infects the bloodstream, the disease is known as septicemic plague. Pneumonic plague,
which occurs when the lungs are infected, may also develop from bubonic plague or by inhaling Y. pestis
from the air.32
Pneumonic plague is a serious terrorist threat both because Y. pestis can be aerosolized and because the
disease can spread from person to person. These factors create the possibility that the disease can be spread
quickly and widely. In a worst case scenario, the release of 50kg of Y. pestis in aerosol form over a city with
5 million inhabitants would cause 150,000 cases of plague, about half of which would require hospitalization.
33 Bubonic plague may also be a terrorist threat. In fact, Japanese military scientists during WWII used
plague-infected ﬂeas to spread bubonic plagues in some areas of China.34
Persons usually become ill two to six days following infection. Symptoms of the disease diﬀer depending
on the mode of infection, but fever and malaise are typical. The disease may be treated with prophylactic
antibacterial therapy involving streptomycin or gentamicin. Therapy usually must begin 24 hours after the
onset of symptoms to be eﬀective. About 14% of cases of plague are fatal, though 100% of pneumonic plague
cases are fatal if left untreated.
31See Cieslak & Eitzen, supra note 23, at 83.
32See CDC, Disease Information: Plague, at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/plague/index.asp.
33Ctr. for Biosecurity, Plague Fact Sheet, at http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/pages/agents/plague facts.html.
34Curtis D. Malloy, A History of Biological and Chemical Warfare and Terrorism, in Public Health Issues in Disaster
Preparedness 87 (2001).
9Outbreaks of smallpox have occurred continually for thousands of years, but the disease was eliminated
through a successful worldwide vaccination campaign. The last reported case of naturally occurring smallpox
was treated in Somalia in 1977. The disease is caused by a variola virus spread from person to person through
face to face contact (particularly when the infected person is coughing), contact with infected body ﬂuids,
or contact with infected objects such as bedsheets. Though rare, the disease sometimes can spread through
the air.35
Typically there is a 12 to 14 day incubation period following exposure. The ﬁrst symptoms include fever,
malaise, aches, and vomiting. After a period of about three days, a rash emerges as red dots in the tongue
and mouth. The dots develop into sores which break open. Soon afterwards, a rash develops on the skin
spreading downwards from the face to all parts of the body. In a period usually lasting 12 days, the rash
develops into bumps, then pustules, then scabs. Eventually the scabs fall oﬀ, leaving scars. Once the scabs
have fallen oﬀ, the person is no longer contagious. Death occurs in about 30 percent of cases.
Several factors make smallpox an attractive agent to terrorists. Most persons no longer are vaccinated
against the virus, and vaccine stockpiles are dwindling. Moreover, there is no eﬀective treatment for the
disease, thoughvaccination within the ﬁrst few days after exposure may prevent the disease from occurring.
Currently only two maximum security facilities maintain stockpiles of the virus, making acquisition of the
virus diﬃcult. However, other unknown stockpiles may exist, and reconstruction of the virus may soon be
possible since its entire genomic sequence is known.
Tularemia is an illness caused by Francisella tularensis, a bacterium often found in animals. The disease
can spread in several ways: being bitten by infected ﬂeas or other insects, handling infected animals, or
35CDC, Emergency Preparedness & Response: Smallpox, at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/index.asp.
10breathing in the bacterium. Typically the disease does not spread from person to person.
Several non-speciﬁc ﬂu-like symptoms are associated with tularemia, making detection diﬃcult. Symptoms
usually start three to ﬁve days after exposure. If left untreated, the disease can be fatal. However, several
antibiotics may be used to treat the disease, and the FDA is currently reviewing a vaccination against the
disease.
The highly infectious nature and natural abundance of F. tularensis makes it an attractive bioterrorist agent.
Breathing even a few bacteria could cause fatal pneumonia. However, manufacturing an aerosol version of
the bacterium is a technically sophisticated task.36
Viral hemorrhagic fevers are a group of diseases caused by four types of RNA viruses. While the diseases
diﬀer in symptoms, severity, and mode of transmission, they typically damage the vascular system and the
ability of the body to regulate itself. The virus typically lives in infected animal hosts. Humans typically
acquire the virus by coming into contact with the host. The viruses may also be infectious via aerosol or from
person to person (as is the case with Ebola virus), causing them to be a high priority concern. While patients
may receive supportive therapy for their disease, there is no established cure. Vaccines have developed for
yellow fever and Argentine hemorrhagic fever.
2. The Motivation to Use a Biological Agent
The past use of biological weapons has been isolated to a few, amateurish or low-consequence events. For
example, in 1984, members of an Oregon cult plead guilty to pouring culture of Salmonella Typhimurium in
salad bars and coﬀee creamer containers in an eﬀort to inﬂuence an upcoming election.37 751 people became
36CDC, Emergency Preparedness & Response: Tularemia, at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/tularemia/index.asp.
37See Malloy, supra note 34, at 90.
11ill. A comparable event occurred in Wakayama, Japan, where a person intent on committing insurance fraud
poisoned curry with arsenic. Sixty-seven people became ill. Finally, the anthrax letter attacks created a
great deal of fear and cost the U.S. Postal Service $5 billion, but they ultimately caused only ﬁve deaths and
seventeen infections.38 While historical precedent for biological attacks is limited, the lack of precedent does
not equate with the absence of a threat. Attacks with biological agents have become more frequent due to
the emergence of new kinds of terrorist organizations. In the near future, these organizations will continue to
launch small-scale attacks, but large-scale attacks will become more likely as terrorist organizations update
capabilities.
The emergence of a new kind of terrorist organization increases the likelihood of future biological attacks.
Despite public belief that terrorists are irrational, traditional terrorist organizations do not wish to cause
mass, indiscriminate casualties, seeing such attacks as unnecessary, counterproductive, or immoral.39 For
instance, the E.T.A., a Basque separatist organization, usually attacks symbolic targets and makes warning
calls before their attacks.40 Both they and the I.R.A. have previously issued apologies for killing innocent
civilians. 41 These organizations are well aware that mass casualty produced by biological weapons may
cause a backlash among their supporters.
While most terrorist organizations continue to shy away from mass-casualty attacks, some terrorist orga-
nizations have demonstrated both their desire and ability to carry out such attacks. These organizations
share several characteristics that increase the likelihood that they will use biological weapons: less apparent
38See Brower & Chalk, supra note 21, at 73.
39See Hearings before the House Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Government Reform, July 26,
2000 (statements of W. Seth Carus); Joseph F. Pilat, “Bioterrorism: Homeland Defense: Next Steps,” Presentation at RAND
symposium, Santa Monica, CA (February 8-10, 2000).
40Spain Maintains ETA Is Main Bomb Suspect a Day Before Elections, Bloomberg News, March 13, 2004, available at
http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=atgcW6VC7eKA&refer=top world news.
41See Jeffrey D. Simon, Terrorist and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons: A Discussion of Possibilities
5 (RAND, 1989).
12ideological or political commitments, charismatic leadership, no well-deﬁned outside constituency, and a
sense of paranoia or grandiosity.42 Within this group, religious fundamentalists pose the greatest threat.43
As one expert explains, “if a terrorist believes that acts of violence are not only politically but also morally
justiﬁed, he has a powerful incentive for any type of terrorist attack.”44
Several factors make biological weapons an attractive choice for these organization. First, some biological
agents are relatively easy to come by: several already exist in nature while others could be bought or stolen
from legitimate facilities. 45 Second, biological weapons may be diﬃcult to detect, making it more likely
that terrorists will get away with an attack. Third, the release of a biological agent generates fear,46 and
that which instills fear also captures headlines, bringing attention to a terrorist’s ideology or mission:
With terrorist attacks occurring on an almost daily basis, the public and the media have
become somewhat desensitized. And with a multitude of terrorist groups ‘competing’ for
the international spotlight, more dramatic incidents are likely in the future.
Finally, biological weapons could cause a great deal of harm. Although bioterrorist attacks have not claimed
many lives to date, estimates of worst-case scenarios are daunting. 47 The WHO has estimated that 36
thousand people could die if 50 kilograms of Y. Pestis were released as an aerosol in a city of ﬁve million.
Some Congressional estimates of an aerosolized anthrax attack on Washington, D.C. place the death toll
at between 130,000 to three million.48 Under the right conditions, a large-scale biological attack could kill
hundreds or even thousands of people.
42See id.; Jonathan B. Tucker, Historical Trends Related to Bioterrorism: An Empirical Analysis, 5(4) Emerging Infectious
Diseases (July-August 1999), at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/tucker.htm..
43Pilat, supra note 39.
44Simon, supra note 41, at 7.
45See Cieslak & Eitzen, supra note 23, at 78.
46The potential of a biological attack to instill fear in a population is evident from the anthrax scare or from the several
hoaxes that have occurred in the past few years. See Leonard A. Cole, Bioterrorism Threats: Learning from Inappropriate
Responses, in Public Health Issues in Disaster Preparedness 66 (2001), (listing 40 selected anthrax hoaxes between 1997
and 1999 and discussing the responses to each).
47Id.
48See Ctr. for Biosecurity, Anthrax Fact Sheet, 1999, at http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/pages/agents/anthrax facts.html.
13An attack could also have a signiﬁcant impact on the economy even if it failed to claim any lives. Direct
expenses would include money spent on clean food and water, medicine, equipment, and medical personnel,
as well as costs incurred from setting up eﬀective quarantines. Some estimates of the anthrax scare following
September 11th suggest that state health departments spen more than a quarter billion dollars responding
to these attacks.49 Though diﬃcult to estimate, indirect costs like lost productivity and decreased faith
in the ﬁnancial markets could also be signiﬁcant. A U.S. ban on Chilean grapes following the discovery of
two cyanide-tainted grapes signiﬁcantly harmed the Chilean economy, and the World Trade Center attacks
caused millions in losses.50
In light of this signiﬁcant economic eﬀect, some previous biological attacks were aimed not at creating casu-
alties but at disrupting markets. For instance, in 1978 Palestinian extremists injected mercury into Israeli
oranges with the stated goal of damaging the Israeli economy.51 Bin Laden and other members of Al-Qaeda
have also threatened to attack economic targets to destabilize the American economy.52 The potential eco-
nomic eﬀects are great from both perceived and real threats.
Finally, a large-scale attack would have a substantial psychological impact that could threaten the ability
of governments to function and leave the nation in disarray. The Federal government has conducted several
simulation exercises to estimate the extent of the damage and measure the degree of preparedness. One exer-
cise dubbed “Dark Winter” presented the scenario of a smallpox release in shopping malls in Oklahoma City,
Philadelphia, and Atlanta with the initial infection of three thousand people. Within two weeks, 160,000
smallpox cases in twenty-ﬁve states were estimated to occur. 53 The rapid spread of the disease quickly
49147 Cong. Rec. S. 13902 (2001) (statements of Senator Biden).
50See id. at 11.
51See Simon, supra note 41, at 9.
52See Gov. James S. Gilmore, chairman, Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Implementing the National Strategy 10 (December 15, 2002) (hereinafter Fourth Annual Gilmore Commission Report)
(quoting tapes from Bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda members).
53See Tara O’Toole, Thomas V. Inglesby, Jr., and Michael Mair, Shining Light on Dark Winter, 34 Clinical Infectious
Diseases 972 (2002), available at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v34n7/020165/020165.html.
14overwhelmed the health care system and left the nation in chaos.54 In another simulation exercised dubbed
TOPOFF, the scenario presented was the release of Y. Pestis in the Denver Performing Arts Center, leading
to 500 symptomatic victims within three days. Four days after the release, oﬃcials estimated that between
3700 to 4000 people became infected, leading to 950 and 2000 deaths.55
While many terrorists have not insisted upon causing such devastating damage, recent changes to terrorist
motivations suggest that attempts at large-scale attacks will become increasingly more likely in the future.
Biological agents present terrorists with a good choice for these terrorist organizations to inﬂict physical,
economic, psychological, and political harm on a population. These changes suggest that terrorist organi-
zations may increase their eﬀorts to acquire or develop biological weapons, increasing the threat of future
biological attacks.
3. Technical Barriers to a Biological Attack
Although some terrorists possess the right motives and incentives to use biological weapons, terrorists face
signiﬁcant technical barriers in preparing for a large-scale biological weapons attacks. Although some highly
infectious biological agents are not hard to ﬁnd in nature or to acquire from legitimate sources,56 many
others, like smallpox, are diﬃcult to come by.57 Moreover, recognizing and isolating the particularly lethal
strains requires a great deal of expertise and technologically sophisticated equipment.58 Purifying and
54See Nicholas Kristoﬀ, Lock ‘Em Up, New York Times, May 2, 2003, at A33.
55See Thomas V. Inglesby, Rita Grossman, and Tara O’Toole, A Plague on Your
City: Observations on TOPOFF, 32 Clinical Infectious Diseases 436 (2001), available at
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v32n3/001347/001347.html.
56“Clostridium botulinum, for example, is ubiquitous in soil and cultured easily by anyone with modest training in microbi-
ology. Ricin is extracted readily from castor beans...recipes for its production are disseminated widely and available on the
internet.... Clinical laboratories handle cultures of [potential agents] and constitute a potential source for their acquisitions.”
Cieslak & Eitzen, supra note 23, at 80.
57See Tara O’Toole, Smallpox: An Attack Scenario, 5(4) Emerging Infectious Diseases 540 (July-August 1999) available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/otoole.htm (“The international black market trade in weapons of mass destruction
is probably the only means of acquiring [smallpox].”).
58See Gov. James S. Gilmore, chairman, First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing
15manufacturing these agents pose even more signiﬁcant hurdles. Botulinum toxin, for instance, often loses its
toxicity during puriﬁcation. And turning b. anthracis into a form appropriate for an attack, “necessitates
a combination of skill and extreme care during a production technique that involves the application of heat
or chemical shock.”59 Mass production also requires the use of technically sophisticated equipment that
may be diﬃcult to acquire and will increase the risk of detection.60 Preparing an agent for deployment
also presents a signiﬁcant technical barrier. Terrorists will likely need to aerosolize an agent to inﬂict mass
casualties on a population. However, only a few agents are suitable for aerosol contamination. Moreover,
turning these agents into an aerosol requires expensive equipment, often destroys the organism, and entails
signiﬁcant risk that the terrorist will accidentally infect himself.61 Eﬀective outdoor deployment also requires
the cooperation of meteorological factors (though deployment in a building would avoid this variable).
Previous failures demonstrate the diﬃculty of acquiring and developing high-impact biological weapons. On
eight occasions between 1990 and 1995, Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese religious cult, attempted to aerosolize
anthrax and botulitum toxin to use in attacks on the Japanese subway system. Despite being well organized
and funded, the group failed on each occasion to develop the weapon, opting instead to attack with sarin
gas.
Given the current capabilities of terrorists organizations, small-scale attacks will continue to be the norm in
the near future. As one expert explains,
Crude bioterrorism does not really require advanced technologies or specialized equipment.
In any case, the production of biological agents can be undertaken in a small facility, with
no readily identiﬁable distinguishing features or signatures. Few precursor materials are
essential, although growth media are needed to produce signiﬁcant quantities of an agent.62
the Threat 21 (December 15, 1999) (hereinafter First Annual Gilmore Commission Report). In 2002, the Commission
reaﬃrmed its conclusion that the barriers to developing high-impact biological weapons were formidable. See Fourth Annual
Gilmore Commission Report, supra note 52, at 18.
59First Annual Gilmore Commission Report, supra note 58, at 21.
60See id.
61See id.
16However, the increasing accumulation and dissemination of know-how may place high-impact biological
weapons within the reach of many terrorist organizations. Research activities into biological agents are
“dual use,” having the potential to be used both defensively and oﬀensively.63 For instance, scientists
interested in controlling rodent populations have created an extremely virulent mousepox to sterilize mice,
but the technique was also useful in creating a virulent smallpox weapon.64 Thus, “the knowledge that is
being accumulated in the basic biochemistry of infection is going to make it a lot easier to perfect biological
weapons than to build defenses against them.”65
Moreover, several simultaneous events have increased the dissemination of information necessary to develop
biological weapons. Technological progress in many parts of the world creates the possibility that legitimate
biological facilities may be exploited to produce biological agents or to mask biological weapons agents.66
Many countries may not have the resources or concern to invest in signiﬁcant security for these facilities.
More generally, progress in the basic sciences and dissemination of that information may also increase the
risk of serious biological attacks.67 Finally, the internet may also serve as a new medium for disseminating
knowledge, providing easy access to important information.68
The potential recruitment of knowledgeable scientists also creates a signiﬁcant threat that terrorist will
increase their capabilities. The poor economic condition and inadequate physical security in the former
Soviet Union and other countries creates conditions ripe for the recruitment of scientists and the acquisition
of agents. In this environment, scientists with biological or bioweapons experience may sell their expertise
63For a discussion of dual use technologies, see Gigi Kwik, Joe Fitzgerald, Thomas Inglesby, Tara O’Toole, Biosecurity:
Responsible Stewardship of Bioscience in an Age of Catastrophic Terrorism, 1(1) Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense
Strategy, Practice, and Science 27-35 (2003).
64See Brower & Chalk, supra note 21, at 73.
65Joshua Lederberg, “Bioterrorism Homeland Defense: Next Steps,” Presentation at RAND Symposium, Santa Monica, CA
(February 8-10, 2000).
66John M. Lauder, Statement by Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation John A. Lauder on the World-
wide Biological Warfare Threat to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (March 3, 1999), at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public aﬀairs/speeches/1999/lauder speech 030399.html.
67World Health Organization (WHO), HEALTH ASPECTS OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS 16 (2001)
(hereinafter “WHO 2001”).
68See First Annual Gilmore Commission Report, supra note 58, at 49; George J. Tenet, Worldwide Threat 2001: National
Security in a Changing World, statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (February 7, 2001).
17to the highest bidder. “By importing talent and buying technology, state and non-state actors can make
dramatic leaps forward...including the development of new agents and delivery systems, a much earlier
achievement of indigenous capabilities, and more sophisticated denial and deception techniques.”69 In fact,
some scientists have already been recruited by potentially terrorist states.70 Aum Shinrikyo has also actively
recruited graduate scientists and technicians.71
One ﬁnal note: the discussion above has focused on the threat from individual terrorist organizations. Some
claim that the greatest current threat comes not from these terrorist organizations but from state-sponsored
terrorists. Some states possess the human and physical capital required to surmount the technical hurdles
mentioned above. Moreover, the leadership of these countries may believe in engaging in risky enterprises,
or they may support terrorist organizations in their eﬀorts to acquire and develop biological weapons. 72
Several “hostile” states such as Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria have or are developing oﬀensive biological
weapons capacities73 despite treaties banning the proliferation of these weapons. Fortunately, the likely
political or military repercussions a state will face for their support of biological warfare may dissuade many
from using their capacity to further terrorist objectives.
Evaluating the current and future risk of a biological attack is fraught with uncertainty, particularly because
much of the evidence is anecdotal or speculative. One cannot discount the possibility that new events or
new information will mitigate the risk or the uncertainty of future attacks. This could occur as a result of
speciﬁc events, like capturing fundamentalists or discovering the extent of a country’s biological weapons
program, or more general ones, like passing tougher international treaties against proliferation or increasing
69Lauder, supra note 66.
70See Jonathan B. Tucker and Kathleen M. Vogel, Preventing the Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons and
Know How, 71 The Nonproliferation Review 88, 89 (Spring 2000); Lauder, supra note 66.
71See WHO 2001, supra note 67, at 83.
72One commentator notes that a biological weapons release by a hostile state would look like a terrorist one, making detection
diﬃcult. See Carus, supra note 39.
73See id.; Lauder, supra note 66.
18surveillance on the Internet. Despite these possibilities, historical trends demonstrate a rise in the use of
biological agents as weapons. Bioterrorism incidents, both actual and hoaxes, increased sharply from about
a dozen yearly incidents in the early 1990’s to 181 incidents in 1998.74 At the same time, the vast majority
(87%) of attacks against U.S. interests have involved bombs or conventional explosives.75 Because bombs
and hijackings require less preparation and investment than biological weapons, many believe that these
weapons will continue to pose the most likely current threat.76 Nevertheless, with more groups interested in
biological weapons and an ever-increasing capability to develop these weapons, the risk of a biological attack
will likely continue to rise, with small-scale attacks posing the greatest current biological threat.77
B. Developing Bioterrorist Countermeasures
The inherently speculative nature of drug research and development makes it a very costly undertaking. It
typically takes 10 years to move a drug from pre-clinical studies to market. 78 For every drug that does make
it, thousands of compounds must be screened in pre-clinical trials.79 Moreover, only 20% of the compounds
entering clinical trials gain FDA approval.80 One controversial study has estimated that the out of pocket
costs are $400 million for each new drug. 81 The ﬁgure includes money spent on discovery, pre-clinical and
74See Tucker, supra note 42.
75See Laura Parker, Terrorists Most Likely Weapon Here: Bombs, USA Today, May 16, 2003, at 1A (“many analysts are
concerned by what they see as overblown descriptions – by the media and the government – of the threats that unconventional
weapons pose, which the analysts say have perpetuated myths about how serious the risks are.”).
76See id.
77See also, CIA report says Al-Quaida attacks could be small-scale, CIDRAP News, at
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/btwatch/btwatch-jun-2003.html (“Al-Qaida’s ultimate goal is to
use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to cause mass casualties, but the group and associated extremists are likely to
launch small rather than large-scale attacks, according to a CIA report prepared last month.”).
78See Henry Grabowski, Pharmaceuticals: Politics, Policy, and Availability: Patents and New Product Development in the
Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries, 8 Geo. Public Pol’y Rev. 7, 9 (2003) (citing
DiMasi, J.A. 1995a. Success Rates for New Drugs Entering Clinical Testing in the United States. Clinical Pharmacology
and Therapeutics 58:1-14); see also, Charles E. Hammer, Drug Development 2 (1982) (“The odds of success in discovering
a new drug are very small.”).
79See Grabowski, supra note 78, at 9 (citing DiMasi 1995).
80See id.
81See, Grabowski, supra note 78, at 9 (citing DiMasi, J.A., R.W. Hansen and H.G. Grabowski. 2003. The Price of Innovation:
New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, Journal of Health Economics 22:151-185). Several groups have questioned this
ﬁgure’s accuracy, noting that it did not account for the tax incentives and government grants given to pharmaceuticals, and
that the study’s author received his funding from the pharmaceutical industry. See Ceci Connoly, Price Tag for a New Drug:
19clinical trials, and an allocation for the cost of failure. Expenditures in the clinical phase account for 70% of
these costs, reﬂecting the high per-patient costs of clinical trials, the number of patients required, and the
failure rate of these trials.
In the drug business, time is also money. Long clinical trials and approval times delay the time it takes
to recoup R&D investment, increasing the cost of capital. The study above estimates that, because of the
long R&D times involved, the capitalized costs for new drugs is $802 million. This ﬁgure nearly tripled the
$231 million estimate released by the authors in 1987.82 More recent ﬁgures by the same author estimate
capitalized costs at $897 million, a thirty percent increase.83
Drug companies undertake these expenses knowing that hitting a winner means big payoﬀs. In a sample of
118 compounds studied by DiMasi, about one half of the revenue is accounted for by the top tenth of new
drug introductions, and only the top three deciles cover average R&D costs.84 Top selling drugs achieve
peak sales in the hundreds of millions (or low billions) of dollars, while lower selling drugs account for sales
in the tens of millions.85 These ﬁgures suggest that a few top selling drugs account for the long run economic
success of the pharmaceutical industry.
The market for many bioterrorist countermeasures is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than that of new drugs. The broad
category of bioterrorist countermeasures includes several diﬀerent types of products ranging from general
use antibiotics to detection and analysis equipment to special vaccines against bioterrorist agents. There are
many private and public buyers ready to purchase some of these products either for non-terrorist purposes or
$802 Million, Washington Post, December 1, 2001, at A10.
82See Press Release, The Ballooning Price Tag, December 4, 2001, at http://www.tufts.edu/communications/stories/120401BallooningCosts.htm.
83New Drugs Get a Heftier Price Tag, Boston Business Journal, May 13, 2003, at
http://boston.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2003/05/12/daily16.html.
84See, Grabowski, supra note 78, at 9.
85See id.
20in preparation for a biochemical attack. However, other countermeasures do not serve any current purpose
and therefore have a small or insigniﬁcant market. Facing these conditions, many companies may not be
willing to invest the money required to develop these countermeasures while foregoing the blockbuster proﬁts
from other drugs.
Given the numerous dimensions of the problem, several agencies have brought their expertise to bear to
solve this perceived market failure. In general, the NIH (usually through the National Institutes of Allergies
and Infectious Diseases, or NIAID) conducts or supports research to promote the development of counter-
measures.86 Research eﬀorts include both basic research into virology or immunology and clinical studies,
including funding the clinical trials for biological countermeasures. The Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) purchases countermeasures for use in the case of a biological or chemical attack.
Finally, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires testing to ensure that countermeasures are the
safe and eﬀective. In an eﬀort to lower costs and to deal with the problems peculiar to countermeasure
development, the FDA has updated several of its requirements for testing the safety and eﬃcacy of these
drugs. These changes, desirable in some situations and undesirable in others, pushes the FDA further into
the role of drug development collaborator, a change that ﬁrst occurred in response to the AIDS and Cancer
crises of the 1980’s.
1. History of FDA Regulation
FDA’s regulatory authority over foods, drugs, and cosmetics began in the early part of the last century.
Around that time, members of Congress and other groups became concerned with the quality and safety
86Research may also be conducted by several other departments, such as the Department of Defense (DoD) or the CDC.
21of ‘patent’ medications and nostrums.87 Many of these drugs were at best ineﬀective and at worst seri-
ously unsafe. Manufacturers marketed nostrums to deal with conditions ranging from cancer and epilepsy
to baldness and bust-lines.88 Many contained nothing but worthless ingredients. For instance, analysis of
one medicine, Dr. Kilmer’s Indian Cough Cure, revealed that it contained mostly alcohol, water, and sugar.
Other medications, some given to children, contained dangerous ingredients such as morphine. 89 In this
environment, consumer, industry, and medical groups began calling for a bill that would control the sale
of these drugs and deal with the problem of food adulteration. Congress worked on several versions of the
bill, but it did not pass a ﬁnal act until after the publication of The Jungle, a book detailing the unsanitary
conditions of Chicago’s meat packing industry. The controversy surrounding the book ﬁnally spurred a ﬁnal
action. Congress passed the Pure Food and Drugs Act in 1906. 90
Subsequent eﬀorts to enforce the law revealed that it contained several weaknesses. The law prohibited
the shipment in interstate commerce of adulterated or misbranded foods or drugs but did not call for any
pre-market drug testing and did not require ingredient or warning labels. Instead, the law relied on post-
marketing seizure of the oﬀending product and provided for civil and criminal penalties to deter misbranding
and adulteration.91 In each case, the Bureau of Chemistry (the precursor to the FDA) had to petition the
courts to stop the distribution of the oﬀending product. As later interpreted by the Supreme Court, the
original law also could not prohibit false therapeutic claims.92 Subsequent amendments closed this loophole,
but the Bureau still had to show that the seller had actual knowledge that the claims were false. 93 A
defendant could escape conviction simply by proving his subjective belief that his product worked.94
87See James Harvey Young, The Long Struggle for the 1906 Law (1981), at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼lrd/history2.html.
88See The Patent Medicine Menace, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/history/Gallery/galleryintro.htm.
89For examples, see 2 Arthur J. Cramp, ed., Nostrums & Quackeries (1921).
90See Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
91See id.; Wallace F. Jansen, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels, Part II, FDA CONSUMER (1981), at
http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/∼lrd/histor1a.html.
92See United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911).
93See Jansen, supra note 91.
94See id.
22Congress has strengthened FDA’s power several times over the last century. The ﬁrst major changed oc-
curred in 1938 when Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.95 Unlike the 1906 Act,
the 1938 Act created a pre-market notiﬁcation regime whereby manufacturers were required to notify the
FDA prior to marketing a new drug.96 The FDA was authorized to challenge the product’s safety, to request
injunctions against the distribution of unsafe products, and to inspect factories. Moreover, a showing of
fraud was no longer required to prevent the distribution of products containing false claims. 97
Like its predecessor, the 1938 Act contained several limitations. In particular, the FDA had the burden of
showing that the product was unsafe, and it had no authority to regulate the eﬃcacy of new drugs. Amend-
ments in 1962 made three important changes to further strengthen FDA’s control. First, the Amendments
created a pre-market approval regime which barred the distribution of a new drug until it obtained clearance
from the FDA. Second, the Act directed the FDA to test new drugs for both safety and eﬃcacy, specifying
that “substantial evidence” was required to demonstrate eﬀectiveness. Finally, the FDA received expanded
authority to control clinical trials and to establish standards under which drugs could be shipped for such
trials.98 While the law has been amended several times since 1962,99 the basic structure has remained the
same.
The FDA came to regulate biologics through a diﬀerent series of historical events. Biologics are products
derived from living sources and include products like vaccines, serums, and toxins. These products ﬁrst came
under regulation in 1902, when congress passed the Biologics Control Act in response to the distribution
of tetanus-infected diphteria anti-toxin. The Act intended to prevent the loss of public conﬁdence over the
then emerging national vaccination program by making it unlawful to distribute biologics not prepared at
95See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, Pub. L. No. 75-716, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (hereinafter FD&C Act).
96See Jansen, supra note 91.
97See id.
98See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
99In particular, the FDA was formally authorized to regulate medical devices in 1976. See Medical Device Amendments of
1975, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 90 Stat. 539 (1976). In 1992, FDA was authorized to impose fees on manufacturers to fund activities
related to drug approval. See Prescription Drug User Fee Act, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992).
23licensed establishments. 100 A newly created biologics review board was authorized to test biologic products
and to inspect manufacturing establishments.
As was the case with food and drugs, government control over biologics has been ratcheted up gradually
throughout this century. The Public Health Services Act of 1944 required that manufacturers demonstrate
that their products were “safe, pure, and potent” as a condition of licensing.101 Although the Act did not
mention eﬀectiveness, proof of eﬀectiveness was later imposed at the agency level. Authority to regulate
biologics bounced from agency to agency until power was transferred to the FDA in 1972. That same year,
the FDA issued regulations that brought biologics under the control of the FD&C Act.102 This action, later
codiﬁed by legislation,103 made the requirements for biologics analogous to those of drugs.
2. The Approval Process for Drugs & Biologics
Drugs and biologics must currently undergo a rigorous approval process before distribution to the public.
The FD&C Act prohibits the distribution of any new drug unless the FDA approves an application for
the use of that drug.104 To cross this hurdle, a drug’s safety must be adequately tested by “all methods
reasonably applicable.”105 There must also be “substantial evidence that the drug will have the eﬀect it
purports or is represented to have under the conditions prescribed.”106 The Act deﬁnes substantial evidence
as,
100See Biologics Control Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-243, 32 Stat. 728 (July 1, 1902).
101See Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, §351, 58 Stat. 682 (July 1, 1944); 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(C)(i)(I) (2004).
102See 37 Fed. Reg. 4004 (February 25, 1972).
103See 42 U.S.C. § 262(j) (2004).
104See 42 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2004).
105See 42 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2004).
106Id.
24evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investi-
gations, by experts qualiﬁed by scientiﬁc training and experience to evaluate the eﬀectiveness
of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by
such experts that the drug will have the eﬀect it purports or is represented to have under
the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed
labeling thereof.107
The statute clearly requires, albeit it in broad terms, that a new drug must be adequately tested before
distribution. In its regulations and guidance documents, the FDA has clariﬁed the statute by specifying the
quantity and types of studies required for approval. Generally, preclinical tests on animals and clinical tests
on humans are required to meet the statutory criteria.108 In keeping with standard scientiﬁc practice, clinical
trials must be randomized and controlled.109 Randomized clinical trials require that researchers randomly
assign study participants to one of two groups: the study group that receives the drug being tested and the
control group that receives a substance other than the drug (such as a placebo). In this way, the researcher
can better attribute the observed diﬀerences between the test groups to the eﬀects of the treatment alone.110
Before human testing can begin, the drug’s sponsor must ﬁrst obtain an exemption from the Act’s prohibi-
tions. Exemption may be obtained from the FDA by ﬁling for a claimed exemption for an investigational new
drug (IND).111 The IND protects the safety of human subjects by ensuring that the investigational drug has
undergone adequate laboratory and animal tests for safety and usefulness. It also ensures that the clinical
trials adequately protect the human subjects and are scientiﬁcally designed. The FDA takes four factors
into account when approving an IND: the protection of the human research subject, the adequacy of animal
studies already completed and analyzed, the scientiﬁc merits of the research plan, and the qualiﬁcations
of the investigator112 FDA regulations also require that an Institutional Review Board (IRB) approve the
108See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.22 & 312.23(a)(8) (2004); FDA, From Test Tube to Patient: Improving Health Through Human
Drugs 14-24 (1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/whatwedo/testtube-full.pdf.
109See Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish the Gold Standard for New Drug Approval? Redeﬁning Substantial Evidence
in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997?, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 127, 131 (1999) (discussing the history and role to the randomized
clinical trial in the FDA approval process).
110See id.
111See 21 C.F.R. § 312.20 (2004).
112See 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(a) (2004).
25IND.113
At this point, the drug begins a process of clinical trial that usually consists of three phases. The primary
purpose of phase I trials is to determine how subjects tolerate, metabolize, and excrete the drug. The drug
is administered usually to a few healthy subjects starting at low doses and gradually increasing to higher
ones. If no adverse reactions occur, the drug moves on to phase II, where both safety and eﬃcacy are
determined. Phase II trials involve more subjects than phase I trials, and subjects have the disease the drug
is designed to treat. The drug moves on to phase III once the drug’s eﬀective dose is determined and when
no serious adverse reactions occur. Phase III trials involve hundreds or thousands of patients usually in the
setting where the drug will eventually be used. The trials conﬁrm the results of earlier studies and expand
the knowledge about the drug. Before 1988, two clinical trials were typically required to show eﬃcacy, but
following amendments to the FD&C Act, the FDA may accept one clinical trial when there is other data
corroborates the test results.114
After conducting the appropriate tests, the drug sponsor must submit to the Secretary of HHS a new drug
application (NDA) containing:
(A) full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug
is safe for use and whether such drug is eﬀective in use; (B) a full list of the articles used as
components of such drug; (C) a full statement of the composition of such drug; (D) a full
description of the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture,
processing, and packing of such drug; (E) such samples of such drug and of the articles used
as components thereof as the Secretary may require; and (F) specimens of the labeling
proposed to be used for such drug.115
Given the enormous amount of information required, NDA’s typically consist of 2 to 15 volumes of summaries
and 10 to 100 volumes of data. The FDA has 180 days to review the application to determine whether the
113See 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.103 & 312.66 (2004).
114See FDA, Guidance for Industry: Providing Clinical Evidence of Effectiveness for Human Drug and Biological
Products 3 (May 1998); Kulynych, supra note 109, at 129 (discussing the changes to the requirements for clinical evidence of
eﬀectiveness); see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.20 (2004) (describing the three phases of the clinical trial process); From Test Tube
to Patient, supra note 108, at 18 (generally describing the clinical trial process).
26drug is safe and eﬀective, whether it can be manufactured consistently, and whether the beneﬁts of the drug
outweigh the risks. Often the review takes longer, currently averaging 15.6 months.116 Once the drug’s NDA
has been approved, the manufacturer can begin marketing his drug. However, the manufacturer must still
provide the FDA with prompt reports of serious adverse reactions and periodic reports of all information
relating to safety and eﬃcacy.117
Vaccines and other biologics must undergo a review process similar to that of new drugs. Current law
prohibits the distribution of any biological product unless it has obtained a “biologics license.”118 An appli-
cation shall be approved once it is demonstrated that: (a) “the biological product that is the subject of the
application is safe, pure, and potent” and (b) “the facility in which the biological product is manufactured,
processed, packed, or held meets standards designed to assure that the biological product continues to be
safe, pure, and potent.” The applicant must also consent to “the inspection of the facility that is the subject
of the application.”119Although this statutory language diﬀers from that covering new drug applications, the
FDA has interpreted it to require the same amount and type of data as required for new drugs.120 Hence,
as with new drugs, the applicant must conduct animal and laboratory trials, submit and IND, and conduct
clinical trials to establish safety and eﬃcacy.121
Despite this similarity, the diﬀerent historical evolution of biologics regulations and diﬀerences between bio-
logics and other drug products have led to some diﬀerent licensing requirements. Unlike new drugs, the safety
and eﬃcacy of biological products depends heavily on how they are made.122 Because of this diﬀerences, the
FDA has imposed tighter controls on the manufacturing of biologics. These controls include a requirement
116See FDA’s Drug Review and Approval Times, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/reviewtimes/default.htm#FDA%20Review.
117See 42 U.S.C. § 355(k) (2004); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80 & 314.81 (2004).
118See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2004).
119See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(C)(i) & (a)(2)(C)(ii) (2004).
120See 37 Fed. Reg. 4004 (February 25, 1972); 42 U.S.C. § 262(j) (2004).
121See Consumer/Healthcare Information, at http://www.fda.gov/cber/faq.htm.
122See How do biological products diﬀer from conventional drugs?, at http://www.fda.gov/cber/faq.htm; see also, CBER’s
Recent Initiatives, Policies, and Inspections, at http://www.fda.gov/cber/summaries/pdajapan1003jcp1.pdf.
27that biologics manufacturers obtain licenses for each manufacturing facility making the product.123 In addi-
tion, the FDA adopted a policy requiring the testing of each lot of vaccine prior to release.124 Criticism that
these requirements impose undue costs has led the FDA to remove the establishment license requirement125
and to reconsider the lot release requirement for some biological products.126
3. Improving Drug Approval
The approval process for a new drug involves a tradeoﬀ between ensuring the safety and eﬃcacy of marketed
drugs and promoting the availability of new drugs. Increasing the number of studies required will minimize
the risk that approved drugs are unsafe but will also delay the availability of potentially life-saving drugs.
Higher regulatory hurdles may deter manufacturers from investing the time and money necessary to test a
new product or submit the product for approval. As mentioned above, clinical testing imposes a signiﬁcant
portion of the direct costs of R&D. Long testing and review times also raise capital costs by distancing the
time between the initial investment in R&D and the eventual payoﬀ. Lowering these costs creates additional
incentives for companies to develop new drugs, further increasing the availability of treatments for certain
types of conditions.127
In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, the FDA emphasized the safety and eﬃcacy side of this tradeoﬀ, even
when it meant withholding approval for potentially life saving treatments for terminally ill patients. The
123See Elimination of the Establishment License Application for Speciﬁed Biotechnology and Speciﬁed Synthetic Biological
Products, 61 Fed. Reg. 24227 (May 1996) (hereinafter Elimination of the ELA).
124See 21 C.F.R. § 610.1 (2004); see also, Berkowitz v. U.S., 486 U.S. 531, 547 (1988).
125See Elimination of the ELA, supra note 123.
126See Interim Deﬁnition and Elimination of Lot-by-Lot Release For Well-Characterized Therapeutic Recombinant DNA-
Derived and Monoclonal Antibody Biotechnology Products, 60 Fed. Reg. 63048 (December 1995).
127Although the drug industry typically blames the FDA for the high costs of clinical testing, the FDA often reminds drug
companies that regulatory standards are only one many factors contributing to high drug development costs. Drug companies
often contribute to the problem by prematurely engaging in eﬀectiveness trials or engaging in unnecessary trials to make the
product more appealing to the ultimate consumer. See ); Kulynych, supra note 109, at 129.
28FDA’s position has changed gradually since then. In the case of life threatening conditions, the FDA has
given patients increased access to potentially life saving treatments in one of three ways. First, the FDA has
given patients with serious diseases increased access to drugs that are still undergoing clinical investigation.
Second, the agency has changed the clinical trial process to reduce the time and cost associated with the drug
approval. Finally, the FDA has changed its management procedure to prioritize the review of NDA’s for drugs
that pose the greatest potential beneﬁt to society. Overall, the institution of these policies demonstrates a
change in the FDA’s risk/beneﬁt calculation and more fundamentally, in the agency’s conception of the role
it plays in drug development.
The FDA’s early emphasis on safety and eﬃcacy is exempliﬁed by the case of United States v. Rutherford.
In that case, terminally ill cancer patients sought access to an unapproved cancer treatment Laetrille.128
They argued that the safety and eﬃcacy requirements did not apply in the case of terminally ill patients
and that there was no reasonable standard to measure safety and eﬃcacy when a patient will likely die
regardless of the therapy.129 The FDA took the position that distribution of Laetrille was unlawful because
no NDA had been submitted for the product. The outcome of the case conﬁrmed the FDA’s position. The
Supreme Court unanimously held that the safety and eﬃcacy requirements applied to all products, even
those designed to treat terminally ill patients.130 The court determined that FDA oversight was necessary
because even terminally ill patients could be harmed by unsafe products.131
The Laetrile incident served to reinvigorate a long-standing controversy over the FDA’s cautious approach
to product approval. The FDA’s caution is unsurprising. As mentioned above, the gradual expansion of
128See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 548 (1979).
129See id. at 550-51.
130See id. at 558-59.
131See id.
29the FDA’s powers generally occurred following well-publicized, national tragedies. As a result, the agency’s
history served to create a tradition that emphasized paternalism and safety over access to potentially life-
saving therapies. As a result, the agency’s role is conceived of narrowly as an agency whose sole purpose is
risk prevention rather than an agency more broadly associated with drug development. 132
Political considerations may have also played a role in embedding risk-aversion at the FDA. Oﬃcials charged
with approving or disapproving a new drug can make two diﬀerent kinds of mistakes: (1) approving a drug
that results in death or serious impairment; or (2) refusing to approve a drug that is capable of saving
lives. While the costs of these errors appear compatible, victims of the ﬁrst type of error are more readily
identiﬁable and generate greater controversy than victims of the second type. As a result, FDA oﬃcials “will
be led to reject or postpone approval of many a good drug in order to avoid even a remote possibility of
approving a drug that will have newsworthy side eﬀects.”133
Whatever the explanation for FDA’s early risk aversion, the emergence of the AIDS crises “marked a seminal
event in the evolution of new drug approval policy at the FDA.”134 AIDS patients employed grassroots tactics
to protest FDA policies, including staging protests at the agency’s headquarters.135 Other groups of AIDS
patients established a method whereby patients in clinical trials shared their active drugs with patients
receiving placebos.136 Other forms of civil disobedience included adding treatments prohibited by the IND
protocol and developing a black market for drugs used in clinical trials.137
While it is impossible to determine just how much these eﬀorts inﬂuence decision making, FDA made
132See Sheila R. Shuman & Jeﬀrey S. Brown, The Food and Drug Administration’s Early Access and Fast Track Approval
Initiatives: How Have They Worked?, 50 Food & Drug L.J. 503, 517 (1995) (concluding that after the AIDS crises, “the
agency’s role has shifted from that of regulator to one of collaborator in the development and review process.”).
133Milton Friedman, Newsweek, January 8, 1973, at 582. See also, Kip Viscusi, The Economics of Regulation and
Antitrust 730-31 (3rd Ed. 2001).
134Michael Greenberg, Aids, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y
295, 296 (1999/2000).
135Nancy K. Plant, Food, Allergy and the Health Care Financing Administration: A Story of Rage: Adequate and Well-
Controlled Clinical Trials Reopening the Box, 1 Wid. L. Symp. J. 267, 286 (1996).
136Id.
137See id.
30numerous changes to its policies in the face of criticism from this politically organized and vocal group. The
agency had long allowed for compassionate use IND exemptions that gave patients access to treatments still
undergoing clinical trials.138 However, these exemptions depended on the willingness of doctors to request the
exemptions and of the drug manufacturer to provide drugs free of charge.139 The large amounts of paperwork
required and the lack of incentives for manufacturers made this process inadequate to meet the demand of
AIDS patients.140 In response, FDA updated these procedures informally, and in 1987, promulgated a ﬁnal
rule to formalize and update the process.
Under the ﬁnal rule, seriously ill patients were granted access to new drugs when: (1) the drug is intended to
treat a serious, or immediately life-threatening, disease; (2) there is no comparable or satisfactory alternative
drug or other therapy available to treat that stage of the disease in the intended patient population; (3)
the drug is under investigation in a controlled clinical trial under an IND, or all clinical trials have been
completed; and (4) the sponsor of the controlled clinical trial is actively pursuing marketing approval of the
investigational drug with due diligence.141 Both physicians and the drug’s sponsors were allowed to submit
a protocol requesting the treatment use,142 and sponsors were allowed to charge for the use under certain
conditions.143 Although this “treatment IND” rule was intended in part to gain additional information on
a drug’s safety and eﬃcacy, the primary purpose was “to facilitate the availability of promising new drugs
to desperately ill patients as early in the drug development process as possible.”144
Another procedure that increased the availability of drugs during early trials was the “parallel track” initia-
138See Greenberg, supra note 134 at 315.
139Id. at 316.
140Id.
14121 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(1)(i)-(iv) (2004).
14221 C.F.R. § 312.35 (2004).
14321 C.F.R. § 312.7 (d)(2) (2004).
14421 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(1)(i)-(iv) (2004).
31tive. Meant speciﬁcally for patients with AIDS or HIV, the initiative makes promising investigational agents
more widely available to patients who have no therapeutic alternative and who cannot participate in clinical
trials.145 Under this procedure, the FDA amends IND protocols for drugs that demonstrated promise in
treating HIV and that appeared reasonably safe, taking into consideration the patient population.146 Al-
though similar in nature to treatment IND’s, parallel track protocols were approved “when the evidence for
eﬀectiveness is less than that generally required for a Treatment IND.”147 Thus, the policy expanded access
to AIDS drugs even earlier in the clinical trial process.
In addition to giving patients early access to treatments, the FDA also changed the clinical trial process
to expedite the development and increase the availability of drugs used to treat serious ailments. In 1988,
the agency issued an interim rule that allowed for the approval of life-saving drugs without the need for
undertaking phase III trials.148 This departure from the traditional structure of drug trials promised to
create signiﬁcant savings in time and money. This “expedited development” procedure had been based in
part on the approval process for AZT, which had shortened by six years the time from initial human test-
ing to ﬁnal marketing approval of the drug. But expedited development process also creates the risk that
patients will undertake unsafe or ineﬀective therapies. The FDA attempted to mitigate these risk through
frequent meetings during phase I and II trials and by conducting post-marketing studies to obtain additional
information about the product.149 Although these procedures served to diminish some of the risks involved,
145See Final Policy Statement: Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track Mechanism for
People With AIDS and Other HIV-Related Disease, 57 Fed. Reg. 13250 (April 15, 1992).
146Id.
147Id.
148See 21 C.F.R. § 312.81 et seq. (2004)
149See 21 C.F.R. § 312.82 & 312.85 (2004) (discussing early consultation and phase IV trials). The FDA explained the purpose
of early consultation when it issued the interim rule: “Most important, at the end of early (phase 1) clinical testing, FDA and the
sponsor will seek to reach agreement on the proper design of phase 2 controlled clinical trials, with the goal that such research
will be adequate to provide suﬃcient data on the product’s safety and eﬀectiveness to support a decision on its approvability
for marketing.” Interim Rule: Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Procedures for
Drugs Intended To Treat Life-Threatening and Severely Debilitating Illnesses, 53 Fed. Reg. 41516 (1988). It also explained the
importance of phase IV trials: “If FDA approval is gained on the basis of limited, but suﬃcient, clinical trials, it will usually
be important to conduct postmarketing (phase 4) clinical studies that will extend the knowledge about the drug’s safety and
eﬃcacy and allow physicians to optimize its use.” Id.
32the agency ultimately justiﬁed this new procedure by accepting that a diﬀerent risk-beneﬁt calculus would
apply to products intended to treat seriously ill individuals.150
Other changes to the clinical trial procedure occurred in 1992, when the FDA formalized a procedure that
allowed the approval of drugs used to treat serious or life-threatening diseases based on data of “surrogate
endpoints.”151 A surrogate endpoint is an indicator such as a clinical measurement or physical sign that is
reasonably likely to predict a clinical beneﬁt. Under the “accelerated approval” procedure, drugs for hyper-
tension, for example, could be approved based on their eﬀects on blood pressure rather than on survival or
stroke rate.152 Because clinical beneﬁts often took several years to manifest themselves, relying on surrogate
endpoints served to shorten the clinical trial and reduce the time and costs for developing these types of
drugs. Follow on studies were required to conﬁrm the clinical beneﬁts of the drug.153
Finally, the FDA also changed its NDA review practice to prioritize review for those drugs that represent the
greatest potential beneﬁt to society. For AIDS drugs in particular, the agency created a new priority cate-
gory, the AA category, to ensure that NDA’s for AIDS drugs received the highest priority review.154 More
generally, the FDA has created priority and standard review categories and instituted review procedures
that direct attention and resources to highly-beneﬁcial drugs.155 FDA and independent studies conﬁrm that
the priority review category greatly reduces the time of NDA review. The FDA’s own study show that in
the period from 1995 to 2000 standard review times vacillated between thirteen to about sixteen months
while priority review time remained stable at about six months.156 Importantly, because this change does
150“The agency recognizes that safety and eﬀectiveness are not absolute (i.e., not all drugs are free of risk or have unequivocal
beneﬁts), but must be assessed in light of what condition the drug treats. This is particularly true in the case of drugs to treat
life-threatening diseases, where drugs that are quite toxic may nevertheless be considered safe under the circumstances.” Id.
151See 21 C.F.R. §314.520 (2004).
152See Final Rule: New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated Approval, 57 Fed. Reg.
58942 (1992) (the comment noted surrogate endpoints had been used to approve these drugs prior to the rule).
153Id.
154See, FDA, Expanded Access and Expidited Approval of New Therapies Related to HIV/AIDS (March 5, 1998), at
http://www.fda.gov/oashi/aids/expanded.html.
155FDA Center For Drug Evaluation and Research, MAPP 6020.3, Review Management: Priority Review Policy
2 (April 22, 1996), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/mapp/6020-3.pdf.
156See FDA’s Drug Review and Approval Times, supra note 116.
33not tinker with the clinical trial process, it provides these beneﬁts without signiﬁcantly increasing the risk
of approving unsafe or ineﬀective drugs.
Together, the procedures above fulﬁlled the goal of expanded access in several ways. By reducing time
to approval and the investment necessary to get the drug to market, expedited development, accelerated
approval, and priority review increase the prompt availability of life-saving drugs and created additional
incentives for companies to invest in these products. One empirical study found that the regulatory phase
for drugs initially approved under expedited review was 3.3 years, signiﬁcantly less than for non-expedited
drugs.157 Similarly, the review time for AIDS drugs reviewed under expedited approval procedures averaged
less than ﬁve months, substantially less than the ﬁfteen months approval time for NDA review.158 As a result,
some industry analysts have predicted that pharmaceutical ﬁrms will intensify their eﬀorts to research and
develop treatments for serious diseases.159 Treatment INDs and parallel track procedures have impacted
drug availability in a diﬀerent way. While not directly aﬀecting the time or cost of clinical trials, these
procedures increased the early availability of important new drugs in desperate situations by allowing their
distribution while tests have occurred.
As noted above, the FDA realized that these procedures would sometimes create additional risks for patients.
The course the FDA chose represented a signiﬁcant departure from the agency’s position in U.S. v Rutherford.
By implementing these procedures, the agency demonstrated its willingness to allow patients in desperate
situations to undertake greater risks. More fundamentally, these changes to FDA policy demonstrate how
the agency has broadened its self-conception. The agency no longer focuses narrowly on preventing the
approval of dangerous product but sees its mission as one that balances that concern within the broader
157Shuman & Brown, supra note 132, at 513.
158See Greenberg, supra note 134, at 324.
159See Biotech Firms to Boost Cancer Drug Level, Pharma Marketletter, Feb. 2, 2004, at 0.
34context of drug development.160
Congress signaled its approval of these changes and urged continued innovation when it passed the Food
and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997.161 In passing this legislation, one of Congress’ central
concerns was increasing prompt and eﬃcient access to treatments. Several aspects of the legislation demon-
strate this concern. The bill codiﬁes FDA’s mission as one that promotes the public health by, “promptly and
eﬃciently reviewing clinical research and taking appropriate action on the marketing of regulated products
in a timely manner.”162 In addition, the bill’s ﬁndings state that, “prompt approval of safe and eﬀective new
drugs and other therapies is critical to the improvement of the public health so that patients may enjoy the
beneﬁts provided by these therapies to treat and prevent illness and disease.”163 Finally, statements during
the bill’s passage reaﬃrm Congress’ concern with increasing access:
this bill sets up a new legislative and regulatory framework which reﬂects the latest scientiﬁc
advancements. That framework continues the FDA’s strong mission to public health and
safety, but it sets a new goal for [sic.] FDA of enhancing public health by not impeding
innovation or product liability through unnecessary red tape that only delays approval.164
Then Secretary Shalala, while noting her concerns with speciﬁc provisions of the bill, agreed with the
provisions updating the Agency’s mission.165
In order to achieve its goal of providing prompt and eﬃcient access to treatment, the bill creates a Fast Track
procedure for drug approval that basically codiﬁed many of the changes noted above. A drug can receive
“fast track” designation if it was intended to treat a serious or life-threatening condition and it demonstrated
the potential to address unmet medical needs.166 The Secretary is required to “take such actions as are
160See Shuman & Brown, supra note 132, at 513; Plant, supra note 135, at 297.
161See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, P.L. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (November 21, 1997) (here-
inafter FDAMA).
162See 21 U.S.C. § 293(b)(1) (2004).
163See FDAMA, supra note 161, § 101(1).
165See id. at 9817.
166See 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(1) (2004).
35appropriate to expedite the development and review of the application.”167 Fast Track designation provides
a formal mechanism for sponsors to seek FDA input into development plans, and fast track products are
often (though not necessarily) reviewed by expedited development (approval after phase II) and accelerated
approval (approval based on surrogate endpoints) procedures. Like other provisions of the bill, this provision
signaled Congress’s approval of the changes that had been occurring at the FDA.
4. Drug Approval and the Bioterrorist Threat
The regulatory and legislative changes above are helpful in considering the steps taken to address the emerging
threat of bioterrorism. Using initiatives similar to the ones above, Congress and the FDA have updated the
approval process for bioterrorism countermeasures to promote the development of these drugs and devices
and to allow for earlier access to these products. As with other drugs, the decision to approve bioterrorism
countermeasures presents a tradeoﬀ between assuring the safety and eﬃcacy of the drug or device and
promoting the development of and access to new drugs. However, unlike drugs for AIDS, cancer, and
other serious diseases, bioterrorist countermeasures do not treat signiﬁcant current diseases. This small
but signiﬁcant diﬀerence creates particular hurdles for the development of many countermeasures and alters
the risk-beneﬁt calculation made by the FDA. As it did in the AIDS crises, the agency has become a
collaborator in the development of these countermeasures rather than regulator of their approval. At the
same time, because these new initiatives cannot be justiﬁed by the immediate need of patients suﬀering from
serious or life-threatening diseases, the bioterrorist threat has pushed this role even further than before.
a. Accelerated Approval of Bioterrorist Countermeasures
167Id. at § 356(a)(3).
36The Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 helped to implement major
changes to the approval process for countermeasures. One of the most important changes authorizes the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, upon request of the product’s sponsor, to designate a priority coun-
termeasure as a fast track product and to give such products priority review designation.168 As mentioned
above, fast track designation provides a formal mechanism for sponsors to seek FDA input into development
plans and provides sponsors with the option of requesting approval based on surrogate endpoints (accelerated
approval) or after phase II clinical trials (expedited development).
The fast tracking of bioterrorism countermeasures represents an important departure from previous FDA
policy. Fast tracking, accelerated approval, and expedited development were originally justiﬁed by the dire
need of patients with serious conditions. The FDA recognized that these products may pose additional risks
to patients, but stated that a diﬀerent risk beneﬁt calculus should apply in dire cases where no alternative
therapy exists. The rationale for fast tracking and expediting the trial of AIDS and cancer drugs does not
pertain to drugs used to treat outbreaks of bioterrorist diseases. Unlike AIDS and cancer, most of the diseases
listed as bioterrorist threats do not currently aﬀect many members of the population, and the current risk
of a large-scale bioterrorist attack is not great. In these circumstances, the need for earlier approval of
bioterrorist countermeasures is substantially less than the need for AIDS or cancer treatments, particularly
because bioterrorist countermeasures can be approved on an emergency basis. In the bioterrorist context,
the justiﬁcation for accelerating approval of countermeasures rests more heavily on the incentives provided
by the potential cost savings of fast track designation. This change in the justiﬁcation for accelerating drug
development pushes the FDA’s role as collaborator in drug development further than before.
168See 21 U.S.C. § 356-1 (2004).
37There are strong reasons to question whether this change is desirable, particularly if it leads the FDA to use
accelerated or expedited approval. Without the current need for the treatment of bioterrorist diseases, the
beneﬁt of early access is clearly diminished. At the same time the departure from the traditional clinical
trial process will create additional risks for the ultimate recipients of these products. As the FDA has noted,
reliance on a surrogate endpoint creates additional uncertainty about a drug because endpoints may not be
associated with the desired clinical beneﬁt. In addition, long-term or serious health eﬀects of a drug may
not be recognized without large-scale or long-term clinical trials.169
While the risks above pertain to all fast track products, the distinctive features of bioterrorist counter-
measures make it even riskier to accelerate the approval of these products. Mistakes in the approval of a
countermeasure could prove very costly during public health emergencies. The use of an unsafe or ineﬀective
countermeasure during an emergency would likely create signiﬁcant doubt over the government’s ability to
deal with the threat. At best, unsafe or ineﬀective countermeasures would multiply the psychological and
emotional harm caused by an attack; at worst, they could lead people to panic. Unlike drugs currently
approved under fast track procedures, some bioterrorist countermeasures cannot undergo non-clinical, post-
marketing studies to further learn about the products safety and eﬃcacy.170 As a result, the safety and
eﬃcacy of some products may not be known until an actual emergency occurs.
While maintaining the traditional level of testing for countermeasures may increase the price tag for drug
development, this reason alone should not justify designating all countermeasures as fast-track products.
The support for research and development for many of these products is heavily funded through government
169See Lois K. Perrin, The Catch-22 for Persons With AIDS: To Have or Not To Have Easy Access to Experimental Therapies
and Early Approval For New Drugs, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 105 (1995).
170Of course, the FDA could require phase III clinical studies after marketing, but this may lessen a sponsor’s incentives to
designate its product as a fast track product.
38grants and contracts. As the FDA commissioner noted, “in some cases, [agencies at the government] have
done the work to demonstrate safety and eﬀectiveness of certain products for counterterrorism use, but we
don’t yet have companies willing to produce these products.”171 Spending measures, such as grants, purchase
contracts, or tax credits, could be used to promote the research and development of these products without
compromising their safety. Even without such measures, because the government will likely be the greatest
purchaser of some countermeasures, the price tag for these drugs likely will reﬂect the level of spending on
research and development.
This discussion has avoided the debate over whether the FDA’s level of scrutiny is generally appropriate,
and instead focused on the narrower issue of whether departure from the traditional clinical trial process
is justiﬁed in this situation. A less stringent clinical trial process may be appropriate for AIDS or cancer
treatments because of the current need for treatment. Even in these situations, however, commentators and
members of the patient community have criticized accelerated approval mechanisms as subjecting the patient
community to too much risk.172 Without the current need for treatment, the beneﬁt of early access is con-
siderably lessened. At the same time, less stringent procedures create additional risks to patients ultimately
receiving these treatments.173 In some respects, the risks of a mistaken approval are more signiﬁcant for
bioterrorist countermeasures than for other fast track products. The longer time available for the approval
of bioterrorist countermeasures, the current availability of many treatments, and the possibility for emer-
gency approval justiﬁes greater caution in approving these drugs. For these reasons, fast track designation,
accelerated approval, and expedited development should be used sparingly for those products that have the
greatest current need taking into account the alternative therapies for bioterrorist diseases.
171See Project Bioshield: Contracting for the Health and Security of the American Public, Hearing Before the Committee on
Government Reform, April 4, 2003 (statements of Dr. McClellan) (hereinafter “Bioshield Hearing”).
172See id. at 140 (“The fact that some of the very groups that successfully lobbied for both easy access and early approval
now desire to backtrack should send a warning to the FDA.”); Richard S. Nelson, Regulation of Investigational New Drugs:
Giant Step for the Sick and Dying?, 77 Geo. L.J. 463, 484 (1988);
173See Nelson, supra note 172, at 465 (noting that the approval of AIDS treatments involves a similar tradeoﬀ between current
availability and future risks).
39b. The “Animal Rule”
A second provision of the Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act calls on the FDA
to pass the so-called “Animal Rule.” Proposed in 1999 and passed in 2002, the Animal Rule updates the
clinical trial process by allowing some drugs to be approved based on eﬃcacy studies conducted on animals
rather than humans. These drugs would otherwise linger in the IND phase because approval would have
required unfeasible or unethical clinical studies.
The regulation deals with another problem caused by the fact that many potential bioterrorist diseases do
not aﬀect a signiﬁcant portion of the human population. Although clinical trial volunteers undertake greater
risk when participating in tests for experimental drugs, their consent to this risk normally solves the ethical
questions posed by human experimentation. Moreover, clinical tests to determine the eﬃcacy of new drugs
involve patients who already have the condition that the drug is intended to treat. However, in order to
conduct human clinical tests of the eﬃcacy of some biochemical countermeasures, volunteers would have to
be exposed to agents that could cause serious morbidity or death. These volunteers would face not only the
safety risk posed by the drug itself but also the signiﬁcant risk of death or serious illness caused by deliberate
infection by a life-threatening disease.
Deliberately exposing volunteers to life-threatening diseases would test the ethical boundaries of human
experimentation. When making ethical judgments about human experimentation, there are at least two
ethical values that come into play: the value of autonomy and the value of beneﬁcence.174 The value of
autonomy is so fundamental to Western society that many sociologists speak of it as a religious principle.
174See Paul Appelbaum, Charles Lidz, Alan Mesiel, Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice 17
(1987).
40In the words of one commentator, “the promotion of individualism in general and the development of each
individual in particular has become the almost sacred task of the society as a whole and of its members.”175
Given the special place of this principle in our society, it is not surprising that Western ethical systems see
autonomy as a fundamental ethical value. 176 In the view of some ethicists, the value of autonomy becomes
even more important in a society such as our own, where the exalted position of a few experts threatens the
ideals of democracy and freedom by privileging the judgments of some persons over others.177
Although autonomy is a fundamental value, it is not absolute. Western society and Western ethical systems
also view the principle of beneﬁcence (or, alternatively, the preservation of health) as a competing value
when judging the appropriateness of human experimentation. The principle of beneﬁcence imposes a moral
obligation that society protect the well-being of its members and balance the risks and beneﬁts involved in
any action.178 In the clinical context, for instance, the principle requires that drugs undergo animal testing
before being given to humans. Beneﬁcence can be understood as a sign of respect for humanity and as a
prerequisite for personal satisfaction in human life.179 Because of the historical paternalism of the medical
profession, the principle of beneﬁcence traditionally has more to do with biomedical ethics than the principle
of autonomy, though the latter has resonance with “the individualistic temper of American life.”180
The testing of biomedical countermeasures places these values in conﬂict by posing the question: should
patients be allowed to consent to a process that will place their own health in serious jeopardy? Some ethical
theorists have argued in other contexts that a rule prohibiting such consent unjustiﬁable privileges the
principle of beneﬁcence over the principle of autonomy by substituting the clinician’s own expert judgment
175Id. at 26.
176See id. at 27.
177See id. at 28.
178See The National Commission for the Protection Of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
The Belmont Report, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/ohrt/irbs/belmont.html.
179See Appelbaum, supra note 174 at 29.
180See Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Metamorphosis of Medical Ethics: A 30 Year Retrospective, in Marsha Garrison and
Carl E. Schneider, The Law of Bioethics: Individual Autonomy and Social Regulation 12 (2003).
41for that of the patient.181 In short, if suﬃcient patients voluntarily consent to exposure, no reason prevents
such human clinical tests from taking place. This conclusion conforms with the more general observation
that, “the principle of [autonomy] has tended in practice to dominate its fellows.”182
Other commentators have argued that the principle of autonomy “is na¨ ıve, out of touch with an adequate
understanding of human motivation, and, ultimately, philosophically and morally untenable.”183 In the
views of these commentators, autonomy has come to justify policies in situations where it could not possibly
have any application.184 On the other hand, in diﬃcult situations (such as medically assisted suicide), these
commentators point out how autonomy quickly falls by the wayside. Rather than admit that autonomy does
not justify every decision, however, the courts often declare that the consent was not informed, knowing, or
voluntary, even when there is substantial evidence to the contrary.185 In fact, empirical studies of patients
undergoing medical treatment generally have concluded that patients often do not wish to make medical
decisions.186 These studies call into question whether autonomy should be privileged over other values in
making medical decisions.
While potentially controversial in theory, the conﬂict between autonomy and beneﬁcence did not prove
problematic in the debate over the regulation. Most comments to the proposed Animal Rule stated that it
would never be appropriate to expose humans to disabling or lethal diseases. Agreeing with these comments,
the FDA concluded, “it would be unethical to expose volunteers to potentially lethal or permanently disabling
doses of toxic, biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear substances to test the eﬃcacy of products.”187
181See Robert Baker, A Theory of International Bioethics: The Negotiable and the Non-Negotiable, 8(3) Kennedy Inst. of
Ethics J. 233, 258 (1998), citing Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1994).
182See Garrison & Schneider, supra note 180 at 15.
183See Willard Gaylin, Worshiping Autonomy, 26 Hastings Center Reports 44 (November/December 1996), quoted in
Garrison & Schneider, supra note 180 at 15. See also, Willard Gaylin & Bruce Jennings, The Perversion of Autonomy
185 (1996); Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the Ethics of Autonomy, 36 Catholic
Law 455, 509 (1996).
184See Gaylin and Jennings, supra note 183, at 185.
185See Garnett, supra note 183, at 459.
186See Garrison & Schneider, supra note 180 at 85.
187See New Drug & Biological Products: Evidence Needed to Demonstrate the Eﬃcacy of New Drugs for Use Against Lethal
or Permanently Disabling Toxic Substances When Eﬃcacy Studies in Humans Ethically Cannot be Conducted, 64 Fed. Reg.
53960, 53962 (October 5, 1999) (hereinafter Animal Rule).
42Although lacking in theoretical exposition, the conclusion conforms with other legal documents that lay forth
rules dealing with human medical experimentation.188
After concluding that these experiments generally would be unethical, the FDA’s ﬁnal rule allows drug
approval based on eﬃcacy tests on animal species when these eﬃcacy tests establish that the product is
reasonably likely to provide the same clinical beneﬁts in humans.189 The rule only applies when unethical
human studies would be needed to test eﬃcacy; it does not apply to products that could be tested through
ﬁeld trials or that could be approved based on surrogate endpoints.190 Because of its narrow scope, the
rule is expected to apply only once every three years, so the risks of this change has been conﬁned to only
a small group of medicines.191 Nevertheless, as the FDA itself noted, drugs that are eﬀective on animal
species do not necessarily present the same beneﬁts in humans. The FDA attempted to mitigate these risks
by requiring that:
1. There is a reasonably well-understood pathophysiological mechanism for
the toxicity of the chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear substance and its amelioration
or prevention by the product; 2. The eﬀect is demonstrated in more than one animal species
expected to react with a response predictive for humans, unless the eﬀect is demonstrated
in a single animal species that represents a suﬃciently well-characterized animal model
(meaning the model has been adequately evaluated for its responsiveness) for predicting the
response in humans; 3. The animal study endpoint is clearly related to the desired beneﬁt in
humans, which is generally the enhancement of survival or prevention of major morbidity;
and 4. The data or information on the pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics of the
product or other relevant data or information in animals and humans is suﬃciently well
understood to allow selection of an eﬀective dose in humans, and it is therefore reasonable to
expect the eﬀectiveness of the product in animals to be a reliable indicator of its eﬀectiveness
in humans.192
The animal rule demonstrates the agency’s ﬂexibility in dealing with new problems posed by bioterrorist
188For instance, the Nuremberg Code on human experimentation states, “No experiment should be conducted, where
there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experi-
ments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.” Nuremberg Code on Human Experimentation, at
http://www.med.umich.edu/irbmed/ethics/Nuremberg/NurembergCode.html.
189See 21 C.F.R. § 314.610 (2004).
190See 21 C.F.R. § 314.600 (2004).
191See Animal Rule, supra note 187, at 53967.
43disease. While the agency in general should attempt to achieve regulatory uniformity in the drug approval
process, the signiﬁcant ethical problem with human eﬃcacy tests suﬃciently distinguishes this category
of drugs from others. Applying the traditional requirements for clinical trials to these drugs would likely
prevent many of them from achieving ﬁnal approval. Human eﬃcacy tests would likely prove impractical not
only because they would not attract suﬃcient volunteers but also because most IRBs would reject protocols
that required such tests. More importantly, as evidenced by the comments to the rule, most persons would
not ﬁnd these tests ethically justiﬁed when non-clinical tests could provide scientiﬁcally comparable data.
The question of consent to human experimentation is tied to the prior question of whether the research is
necessary. Without the need to engage in morally questionable research, allowing patients to participate in
studies does not demonstrate respect for the principle of autonomy, but simply uses patients as a means to
satisfy curiosity. In utilitarian terms, the marginal beneﬁt of human studies does not justify the signiﬁcant
risks to healthy volunteers.
The alternative – allowing these drugs to linger in IND status – would likely not solve the problem posed by
these products. First, this solution only avoids the problem without changing any of the risks faced by the
ultimate recipients of the drug. The Animal Rule at least mitigates these risks by imposing requirements
designed to ensure that these drugs will have a similar eﬀect in humans. Second, as will be discussed
below, although the drug might be distributed under treatment INDs, obtaining informed consent from all
recipients would likely prove cumbersome if not impossible. Hence, the approval of these kinds of drugs,
based on adequate animal information and with appropriate disclaimers, proved to be the best solution in
this situation.
c. Emergency Use Authorization
44Project Bioshield, a more recent proposal, would authorize the distribution of unapproved countermeasures
in the event of a public health emergency. The bill would allow the Secretary of Health and Human services to
distribute countermeasures that have not achieved ﬁnal approval when the Secretary of Homeland Security,
the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary himself declares that an actual or potential emergency threatens the
civilian or military population.193 To authorize the use of a particular product during a declared emergency,
the Secretary must conclude:
(1) The agent for which the countermeasure is designed can cause serious or life-threatening
disease; (2) The product may reasonably be believed to be eﬀective in detecting, diagnosing,
treating, or preventing the disease; (3) The known and potential advantages of the product
outweigh its known and potential risks; (4) There is no adequate alternative to the product
that is approved and available; and (5) Any other criteria prescribed in regulation are met.194
After making these determinations, the Secretary may authorize the distribution of drugs and prescribe
conditions for their distribution. This proposal provides a ﬂexible procedure to allow for the distribution of
drugs after an outbreak of a bioterrorist disease. While the proposal represents an improvement over current
alternatives, further amendments are required to further protect the rights of the ultimate recipients of these
countermeasures.
The distribution of experimental new drugs for these purposes is currently governed by the treatment IND
rules.195 While these rules might also allow for the distribution of experimental drugs during a public health
emergency, they were not developed to deal speciﬁcally with this threat. For this reason, the treatment
IND rules have several disadvantages to the procedures proposed under the Bioshield Act. First, treatment
INDs carry with them the connotation of experimentation, which is not only inappropriate when the drug
is widely distributed but also potentially confusing to persons who are asked to undergo therapy. While
193See Project Bioshield Act of 2003, Discussion Draft, §4(b)(1), p. 37 (May 6, 2003).
195See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.34 & 314.35 (2004).
45the same may also be true for drugs currently distributed under treatment INDs, patients who currently
receive these drugs already have some understanding of the drug approval process because of their disease.
Stories of AIDS patients, for instance, suggest that they continually scan the press for articles about when
experimental drugs become available.196 Even if they do not have experience with the treatment IND rules,
AIDS and cancer patients have the opportunity to discover more about the drug approval process and make
informed decisions about the risks involved. In an emergency situation, persons asked to take a drug under
a treatment IND will not have time and experience on their side, creating additional concern that they will
not understand the meaning of treatment IND distribution.
Second, treatment IND rules provide no clear means to curtail lengthy informed consent procedures. Cur-
rently, exemptions to informed consent are allowed for emergency research or when obtaining informed
consent is impractical and the risk to the subject is minimal. Neither of these exemptions is suﬃcient to
deal with public health emergencies. The emergency research exemption does not allow an IRB to waive
informed consent during an emergency but instead allows an IRB to approve an “investigation” without
informed consent. 197 Because epidemiological studies could be used to test a widely-distributed product
during an emergency, the term “investigation” could be strained to cover a product distributed during a
public health emergency. However, this interpretation would likely be overreaching in light of the history
of this regulation, whose express purpose is to permit “certain adequate and well-controlled clinical trials to
occur that involve human subjects who are confronted by a life-threatening situation and who also are unable
to give informed consent because of their medical condition.”198 Hence, the emergency research exemption
would likely not cover exemptions required by public health emergencies.
196See Institute of Medicine, Expanding Access to Investigational Therapies for HIV Infection and AIDS 21 (Nat’l
Academies Press 1991), available at http://books.nap.edu/books/0309044901/html/21.html#pagetop.
197See 21 C.F.R. § 50.24 (2004) (“The IRB responsible for the review, approval, and continuing review of the clinical investi-
gation described in this section may approve that investigation without requiring that informed consent of all research subjects
be obtained.”).
198See Final Rule: Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 61 FR 51498, 51498 (October 2, 1996) (emphasis added).
46In addition, even if the emergency research exemption would apply to public health emergencies, the ﬁnd-
ings required by the regulation would not allow an IRB to grant a waiver of informed consent. Speciﬁcally,
an IRB may only grant a waiver if it ﬁnds that the subject’s medical condition makes obtaining informed
consent unfeasible.199 In a public health emergency, the feasibility of informed consent depends not on the
subject’s medical condition but on the conditions of hospitals, which are likely to be severely overwhelmed.
Because the patient remains able to grant consent during an emergency, the IRB could not grant a waiver.
Other rules governing the research of human subjects provide diﬀerent procedures for IRBs to grant waivers
of informed consent. Under the federal policy on human research, an IRB may grant a waiver if: (1) The
research involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects; (2) The waiver or alteration will not adversely
aﬀect the rights and welfare of the subjects; (3) The research could not practicably be carried out without the
waiver or alteration; and (4) Whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with additional pertinent
information after participation.” While this appears to provide additional ﬂexibility, the ﬁrst and third
requirements would make it diﬃcult to grant waivers for countermeasures because use of a countermeasure
may pose more than minimal risk and distribution does not truly involve research. For these reasons,
physicians who administer drugs distributed under treatment INDs may still be require to provide patients
with lengthy informed consent forms prior to administering treatment. 200
Without the ability to obtain at least a partial waiver of informed consent, access to important treatments
may be unnecessarily delayed by what may prove to be a symbolic rather than meaningful procedure. Un-
der current rules, informed consent requires that each patient be given a statement that the study involves
199See 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(a)(2)(i) (2004).
200The FDA may dispense with notice and comment rulemaking for “good cause,” such as when rulemaking would be im-
practicable or contrary to the public interest. See 5 U.S.C. §553(b)(B). However, expedited rulemaking after a public health
emergency will not provide suﬃcient guidance ex ante and aﬀords no opportunity for comment. If fact the government believes
that emergency approval may some day be needed, it would be better to provide guidance before an emergency has occurred.
47research; descriptions of any reasonably foreseeable risks, discomforts, or beneﬁts; alternative procedures;
conﬁdentiality issues about the subject’s medical records; explanation of compensation; treatments available
for possible injuries arising from research involving more than “minimal” risk; and a statement that par-
ticipation is voluntary and that the subject may discontinue participation without penalty.201 Often these
requirements translate into very long documents that may be quite cumbersome to read. Some empirical
studies have concluded that under normal circumstances patients do not understand or recollect informa-
tion given to them either orally from their physician or in a written consent form.202 By multiplying these
problems, a public health emergency diminishes the value of the informed consent process.
In addition, a public health emergency would multiply the problems caused by the time and eﬀort required to
administer informed consent. The smallpox vaccination program, conducted in 2002 by the CDC, illustrates
some of the problems of conducting informed consent under a tight deadline. Producing the documents
required for informed consent proved to be confusing and created diﬃculties for persons trying to implement
the program.203 Although the procedures used to provide informed consent were abbreviated, the program
nevertheless required participants to watch an informational video and complete multiple forms before being
vaccinated.204 This process would be impossible to replicate during a public health emergency when hospitals
are overcrowded and medical personnel are overwhelmed.205 In a true emergency, the time and eﬀort spent
on informed consent should be minimized to allow public health oﬃcials to focus on treating the sick.
At the same time, providing no information to patients regarding the risks of or alternatives to investigational
drug treatments raises the specter of involuntary medical experiments such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,
201See 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a) (2004).
202See Garrison & Schneider, supra note 180 at 113; Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between
Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 Am. J. L. and Med. 361, 385 (2002).
203See GAO, GAO-03-578, Smallpox Vaccination: Implementation of National Program Faces Challenges 14 (April
2003).
204See Holly A. Tailor and Ruth R. Faden, Ethical Considerations in the Formation of a SmallpoxVaccine Policy, 1 Biose-
curity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 47, 51 (2003).
205See Inglesby et al., supra note 55 (discussing “the crises at health care facilities”).
48the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital case, or the Willowbrook State Hospital hepatitis study.206 These
unfortunate incidents serve in part as reminders of the fundamental importance of autonomy in public
health decisions. Even during times of emergencies, public health oﬃcials must respect individual risk
preferences and the right to choose among available treatment options. One commentator has taken the
stronger position that, “heightened respect should be shown for patient self-determination when the patient
is in a life-threatening situation because this is, as a practical matter, the time when the patient’s preferences
and value systems are likely to matter most.”207
The public has the right to expect candor from government oﬃcials particularly during times of crises. A
decision by DHHS to approve an experimental treatment during an emergency could prove disastrous to
the government’s legitimacy if the department does not provide the public with information regarding the
treatment. The distrust that such a decision would engender may also create a practical barrier to dealing
with the emergency because victims may no longer trust the instructions given to them by government
oﬃcials. A decision to curtail informed consent should guard against overreaching and should be narrowly
tailored to the emergency.
By providing clearer authority and greater ﬂexibility to curtail informed consent, Bioshield provides a nec-
essary change to current rules in the unlikely but potential event of a bioterrorist attack. In some ways,
however, the proposal goes too far. While the bill generally requires that the Secretary inform end users of
the beneﬁts of, risks of, and alternatives to the experimental treatment, the Act also allows the Secretary to
curtail disclosure to patients so long as the Secretary determines that providing information is not “feasible
given the circumstances of an emergency.” 208 This discretionary power, already quite broad, is broadened
206For a brief history of these experiments, see Barry R. Furrow, et. al., Health Law 979 (2000).
207See Richard S. Saver, Critical Care Research and Informed Consent, 75 N.C.L. Rev. 205, 253 (1996).
208See Project Bioshield Act of 2003, Discussion Draft, § 564(c)(1)(A)(ii).
49further by the deﬁnition of “emergency,” which includes both actual public health emergencies and potential
civilian or military emergencies.209 In all likelihood, some form of disclosure (perhaps even full informed
consent) would remain feasible during a potential civilian emergency. However, in the context of potential
military emergencies, the Secretary could determine that preparations for war make it unfeasible to provide
disclosure to members of the armed forces. Under current statutes and regulations, only the President can
waive prior consent requirements for members of the military, and the Department of Defense must obtain
independent IRB review of the proposed waiver and must provide service members with a written informa-
tion sheet about the drug.210 Without further specifying when a waiver is appropriate, the proposed bill
could be used to circumvent these safeguards.211
In addition, Project Bioshield provides no opportunity for public comment regarding the substance of a
waiver or the procedures used to obtain them. Other legislation allowing waivers of informed consent
requires that the agency pass appropriate regulations governing such waivers.212 This procedure allows the
public to provide its opinions regarding waivers of consent and usually result in regulations that provide
speciﬁc guidance on how to obtain a waiver and when waivers are appropriate. Clearly, rulemaking would
not be appropriate after an actual emergency has occurred, but the public should be allowed to participate
in rulemaking prior to emergencies to inﬂuence how and when the secretary should grant waivers.
The resulting rules would likely provide more meaningful safeguards than the current bill, which leaves much
to the discretion of the Secretary. As mentioned above, regulations governing waiver of consent for military
209See Project Bioshield Act of 2003, Discussion Draft, § 564(b)(1) (the deﬁnition of emergency includes “signiﬁcant potential
for a national [or military] emergency, involving a heightened risk of attack with a speciﬁed biological, chemical, radiological,
or nuclear agent.”).
210See id. at § 50.23(d)(1)-(4).
211See 21 C.F.R. § 50.23 (2004).
212See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (2004).
50personnel require third party review before a waiver is authorized. Regulations governing emergency room
research provide speciﬁc guidance to determine when informed consent is feasible. Regulations could provide
similar guidance for waivers during public health emergency. The procedures for emergency authorization
should distinguish actual emergencies from potential ones, and provide diﬀerent powers and procedures for
each situation. The discretion to authorize emergency use of a product should also depend on the extent
of testing that the product has undergone. Products still in phase I clinical trials pose a considerable risk
to the lives of individuals. Statisticians explain that even if no serious toxicities are observed in a phase I
clinical trial involving twenty patients, as many as one in six people could experience severe toxic reactions
were the drug distributed.213 More speciﬁc guidance is needed to distinguish products on the basis of the
amount of testing that the product has undergone.
A ﬁnal problem with the procedures proposed by Project Bioshield has to do not with informed consent but
with the potential abuse by manufacturers of the drug. Without the possibility for emergency approval of
their products, manufacturers have the incentive to pursue accurate and immediate testing of investigational
new drugs. These incentives diminish with the possibility that investigational drugs will be widely distributed
without the need for conducting clinical trials.214 Of particular concern are those drugs whose only potential
use is the treatment of a bioterrorist disease because the market for these drugs will only arise in the event
of an attack.
To solve the analogous problem created by treatment INDs, regulations require that manufacturers of those
drugs pursue FDA approval with “due diligence.” Unfortunately, the regulation has proven ineﬀective
because the vagueness of its language makes it diﬃcult to apply and because the FDA has the burden
213See Institute of Medicine, supra note 196, at 28.
214See also Nelson, supra note 172, at 484 (arguing that similar disincentives may occur because of treatment INDs).
51of proving lack of diligence.215 A more eﬀective solution would require that drugs subject to emergency
authorization follow an objective timetable for clinical testing.216 Current regulations require that IND
holders to ﬁle annual reports regarding the status of drug development, but they do little to ensure that
manufacturers pursue research diligently. Regulations imposing time limits and penalties may spur drug
manufacturers to timely pursue drug development. While monetary ﬁnes might eventually be (partially)
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, Congress could allow the FDA to penalize companies by
shortening the patent term for a drug by an amount of time equal (in value or days) to the delay. However,
this penalty is worrisome because it could reduce the incentive to pursue clinical trials to completion.
While these alternatives would require amendments to the FD&C, for many bioterrorist countermeasures, the
solution could be implemented through contracts for the development of these new drugs. These contracts
between the government and drug developers could establish timelines for clinical tests and establish penalties
for non-completion. Moreover, to the extent that contracts for the purchase of countermeasures will only
pay out when drugs have achieved full approval, the drug manufacturer has added incentive to diligently
pursue drug testing. Together, the push of regulations and the pull of these incentives may provide for timely
testing of countermeasures.
With further amendments, Project Bioshield would appropriately balance the value of additional ﬂexibility
with the safeguards needed to prevent overreaching. While distributing unapproved products potentially
poses substantial risks, some authority to distribute investigational drugs and curtail informed consent
procedures is desirable in the event of a dire public health emergency. The FDA has previously stated that
it may be impossible to obtain informed consent in emergency situations and that it is currently diﬃcult
and controversial to grant such waivers.217 By providing for additional authority to exempt cumbersome
informed consent procedures during an emergency, the Bioshield proposal provides a substantial advantage
215See id.
216See id.
217See Animal Rule, supra note 187, at 53963.
52over treatment INDs. In some respects, however, the proposal goes too far. 218 Speciﬁcally, the legislation
(through notice and comment regulation) should provide clearer protection for informed consent during an
actual or potential emergency, and it should guard against the possibility that drugs subject to emergency
use approval will linger in the IND phase.219
C. Conclusion: Looking Forward to New Initiatives
The initiatives described above represent only a few of the numerous proposals that address the growing need
for treatments not just for bioterrorism but for other public health emergencies. There are many proposed
changes on the horizon that will aﬀect the propriety of the initiatives discussed above. In particular, liability
protection, the availability of compensation, the right to grant compulsory licenses of patents in emergencies,
and the FDA’s ability to enforce post-marketing studies of drugs all play an important role in evaluating the
changes meant to deal with the terrorist threat.
Drug companies have repeatedly called for liability protection for drugs developed to treat chemical and
biological agents.220 Imposing liability on a manufacturer after the emergency distribution of an unapproved
products may be unfair to companies manufacturing needed treatments. More importantly, liability protec-
tion for countermeasures may provide additional stimulus for the development of these products, particularly
for small pharmaceutical companies who are especially sensitive to liability. Exposure to liability has already
caused many vaccine manufacturers to exit the vaccine market, producing what many consider a crisis in the
218Accord Bioshield Hearing, supra note 171, at 8 (Comments of Congressman Waxman).
219See also, Hearing on Project Bioshield Before the House Committee of Energy and Commerce, March 27, 2003 (statements
of Dr. Christensen) (“In the interest of protecting the public, wouldn’t it be best for us in this bill to require a contract for
the procurement of a countermeasure to include a term that the product vendors seek FDA approval even after that emergency
approval and that the licensing or clearance for the product and a time table for development of that approval be included in
that contract.”).
220See Bioshield Hearings, supra note 171, at 117 (statements of Dr. Friedman).
53vaccine industry. While it may be too early to tell whether the industries’ are analogous, a similar situation
could occur in the ﬁeld of countermeasure production.
Some policymakers have questioned whether liability protection is appropriate or even necessary. Despite
the uncertainty of bioterrorist attacks, insurance may be available for many countermeasures.221 Moreover,
companies already have some form of liability protection through the government contractor defense and the
Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Eﬀective Technologies (SAFETY) Act. The former shields contractors
from tort liability for products manufactured for the Government in accordance with Government speciﬁca-
tions, if the contractor warned the United States about any hazards known to the contractor but not to the
Government.222 The latter applies a series of restrictions (on damages, for instance) and other special rules
to lawsuits against sellers of a product that have been qualiﬁed by the Secretary of Homeland Security as
“qualiﬁed anti-terrorism technology.”223 Critics worry that shielding manufacturers from liability lessen the
incentives to adequately test drugs before marketing them. The desirability of liability protection must be
considered in light of the changes to the clinical trial process that occur at the FDA.
Closely related to the issue of liability protection is the issue of victim compensation.224 In general, victims
of unsafe or ineﬀective treatment rely on insurance and lawsuits to obtain compensation for their injuries.
In response to the uncertainty and high costs of toxic tort cases, Congress has created several programs
to provide no-fault compensation through an administrative system that is less costly than mass toxic tort
221See In re Novavax, Inc., File No. B-286167, GAO Decision, December 4, 2000 (two of four companies submitting a bid
to a government contract for the development and stockpiling of smallpox vaccine were able to get insurance indemnifying the
government for any claims or costs resulting from clinical trials, use in immuno-compromised individuals and pregnant women,
and use in emergency situations).
222Hercules Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 422 (1996).
223See Julie Samia Mair and Michael Mair, Vaccine Liability in the Era of Bioterrorism, 1(3) Biosecurity and Bioterrorism:
Biodefense Strategy 169, 172 (2003).
224Compensation initiatives are often tied to liability protection, though the government could provide victim compensation
without altering manufacturer liability.
54suits.225 In the view of some ethicists, the availability of compensation would make it not only morally
permissible but morally obligatory to dispense with ordinary informed consent requirements after an at-
tack.226 The Project Bioshield proposal, however, does not provide any mechanism to compensate persons
injury by a product leased through emergency authorization. The addition of victim compensation provides
additional moral justiﬁcation for curtailing informed consent and will help in healing the national trauma of
an attack.227
Aside from the issue of liability and compensation, other proposals have focused on the eﬀect of the patent
system on the government’s ability to provide countermeasures during an emergency. A manufacturer of
patented drug may not be able to keep up with the increased demand for a product following an attack. This
eﬀect already has occurred in the wake of the anthrax scare when the demand for CIPRO quickly outpaced
the ability of the patent holder, Bayer, to produce the drug.228 As a result, members of Congress have
proposed legislation that will allow companies other than the patent holder to manufacturer a product in
response to an attack.229 The proposal clariﬁes the government’s right to grant compulsory patent licenses
and provides a method for establishing a reasonable royalty for the use of a patented product. Other
proposals require that drugs developed with funds from the NIH must be reasonably priced. While the
potential for compulsory licensing may create a disincentive for pharmaceutical companies to develop and
225For example, Congress has created the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program to provide liability protection and
compensation for injuries or death resulting from a qualifying childhood vaccine. See 42 USCS §§ 300aa-10 through 34 (2004).
Congress has also provided liability protection and compensation for injuries arising out of the National Smallpox Vaccination
Program. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, Title VIII, Subtitle G, §§ 861-865, 116 Stat. 2238-2241
(Nov. 25, 2002) (codiﬁed at 6 USCS §§ 441-444); Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Eﬀective
Technologies Act of 2002 (The SAFETY Act); Proposed Rule 68 Fed. Reg. 41420 (July 11, 2003). The controversial September
11th Victim’s Compensation Fund is yet another example.
226See Ruth R. Faden, Holly A. Taylor, and Naomi K. Seiler, Consent and compensation: a social compact for smallpox
vaccine policy in the event of an attack, 36 Clin. Infect. Dis. 1547-51 (2003).
227See id. The authors argue that patients should not be required to pay for the adverse reactions caused by countermeasures,
but they do not discuss who should pay for the harm or how to avoid passing the costs on to patients.
228See Alfred B. Engelberg, Increasing Access to CIPRO: A Strategy for Rapid Creation of a Government Stockpile, a memo
to Senator Schumer, October 13, 2001, available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2001-October/002113.html;
Christopher K. Eppich, Patenting Dilemna: Drugs for Proﬁt Versus Drugs For Health, 43 Santa Clara L. Rev. 289 (2002).
229See Aﬀordable Prescription Drugs and Medical Inventions Act, 107 H.R. 1708 (2001).
55produce countermeasures, the substantial government investment in biodefense (both in terms of research
grants and purchasing contracts) and the availability of a reasonable royalty to patent holders pushes the
incentives in the other direction. At the same time, the ability to quickly ﬁll shortages of a product during
a public health emergency is crucial. Congress should carefully consider compulsory license and reasonable
price provisions in order to provide suﬃcient quantity of a product during public health emergencies.
Finally, post-marketing studies become particularly important for countermeasures approved with acceler-
ated procedures or after animal trials. Past experience has shown that manufacturers often fail to conduct
the studies required of them and that the FDA lacks the ability to monitor studies or the power to require
them. For instance, the FDA previously has declined to sanction drug sponsors for failure to complete post-
marketing studies of AIDS treatments approved using accelerated procedures.230 Although the FDA may
withdraw conditional approval when sponsors fail to satisfy post marketing study requirements with due
diligence,231 the unpopularity of removing drugs from the market has prevented them from applying this
rule. To solve this problem, the FDA should withhold ﬁnal approval until manufacturers submit postmarket-
ing study protocols, and the agency or congress should assert the authority to impose monetary or criminal
sanctions on drug sponsors who fail to comply with postmarketing study requirements.232 The FDA might
also be authorized to sanction companies by curtailing patent terms or protection.
As the agency that approves drug products used to treat bioterrorist diseases, the FDA plays a signiﬁcant
role in the domestic preparation against a bioterrorist attack. The signiﬁcant changes that occurred at the
FDA in response to the AIDS crises have created an agency culture willing to accept a role as collaborator in
the lengthy and expensive process of drug development. These changes have set the scene for and prepared
230Perrin, supra note 169, at 136 & 139.
23121 C.F.R. § 314.530 (2004).
232See also, Perrin, supra note 169, at 152 (discussing similar proposals for AIDS and cancer drugs).
56the agency to deal with the problems posed by bioterrorism countermeasures. In some ways, however, the
initiatives meant to address the bioterrorist threat have pushed the agency’s role as collaborator even further
than before.
Many of the proposals meant to deal with the AIDS and cancer crises in the 1980’s and 90’s have been
altered and reapplied to the problems posed by bioterrorist diseases. Like drugs for AIDS and cancer,
countermeasures can be designated as fast track products and are subject to accelerated approval and
expedited development. In addition, countermeasures will soon be subject to emergency approval procedures
analogous to but more ﬂexible than treatment INDs. Finally, some countermeasures can be approved or
distributed on the basis of eﬃcacy tests conducted on animals only. Like the initiatives introduced to deal
with AIDS and other serious diseases, these changes provide earlier access to treatments in time of need and
accelerate the development and approval of countermeasures for bioterrorist diseases.
Despite the public fear of the risks of a bioterrorist attack, policymakers must keep in mind the current
nature of the threat when proposing measures that could curtail the future safety of the victims of a public
health emergency. The fast track procedures currently in place do not necessarily lead to less stringent
testing of drug products, but the ability to designate countermeasures as fast track products may lead the
FDA to approve these products after curtailed or accelerated clinical tests. Where people are not currently
dying from bioterrorist diseases, the balance of risks and beneﬁts that justify less stringent testing for AIDS
and cancer treatments does not apply to bioterrorist countermeasures. Because of the additional risks of
less stringent testing – some of which are peculiar to countermeasures – countermeasures should receive the
same rigorous testing as required for other products, particularly when countermeasures could be approved
if and when an emergency so warrants.
57At the same time, the FD&C should not be a death pact. The uncertainty of the bioterrorist threat requires
suﬃcient ﬂexibility to ensure that agencies have the appropriate authority to deal with the unlikely but
potentially devastating event of a bioterrorist attack. The animal rule and the proposal for emergency
authorization provide the means to distribute drugs that may be needed in times of emergency. With
additional amendments, they will also provide adequate protections for the rights of the recipients of these
treatments.
58